1sw withdraw fee (#95)

eladiosch · web-flow · commit b6f6d3d8e735 · 2025-08-27T23:59:30.000+04:00
* Modified 1sw withdrawal fee

* Removed {/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}, fixed typos and format errors

* Fixed nrlt formulas. Removed extra parenthesis

* Improved fee description
diff --git a/docs/unifi-avs/unifi-avs-background.md b/docs/unifi-avs/unifi-avs-background.md
@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@ Preconfirmations provide near-instant transaction assurances by leveraging a net
 - 🛡️ Backed by economic security from Ethereum validators
   - Validators stake ETH as collateral, ensuring honest behavior
   - Breaking preconf promises can result in slashing of staked assets
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 - 🌐 Maintain neutrality and decentralization
   - Multiple validators participate, preventing single points of failure
   - Open participation ensures no central authority controls the process
diff --git a/docs/unifi-avs/unifi-avs-protocol.md b/docs/unifi-avs/unifi-avs-protocol.md
@@ -72,11 +72,8 @@ sequenceDiagram
     Note over O,RM: 🎁 Rewards Phase
     O->>RM: Claim AVS rewards
 ```
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 The preconf flow in UniFi AVS involves several interactions:
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 1. Operators set their delegate key to point to a Gateway
 2. Gateway queries the Beacon Node for the lookahead window to check the upcoming proposers
 3. Gateway checks if any of the upcoming proposers are delegated to them
@@ -198,7 +195,7 @@ UniFi AVS will employ a DisputeManager contract to handle slashing and incentivi
 
 1. **Safety Faults**: Penalties for breaking preconf promises, i.e., violating an execution preconf guarantee.
 2. **Liveness Faults**: Penalties for missing block proposals after signing pre-confirmations.
-3. **Rug Pooling**: Penalties for stealing block rewards that are meant to be smoothed.
+3. **Rug Pulling**: Penalties for stealing block rewards that are meant to be smoothed.
 
 :::caution
 The implementation of the mechanism will depend on EigenLayer's slashing design which is still TBD.
diff --git a/docs/yield/burst-threshold.md b/docs/yield/burst-threshold.md
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ The Burst Threshold is Puffer's commitment to Ethereum's Ethos.
 
 ### Burst Threshold
 
-Puffer is [committed to self-capping](https://x.com/puffer_finance/status/1697817894900711700?s=20) its validator marketshare to \(22\%\) of Ethereum's validator set, which we refer to as the protocol's _Burst Threshold_. Instead of abruptly pausing staking and NoOp registration once the burst threshold is reached, Puffer introduces a mechanism to organically reduce staker demand as the protocol reaches the threshold.
+Puffer is [committed to self-capping](https://x.com/puffer_finance/status/1697817894900711700?s=20) its validator marketshare to 22\% of Ethereum's validator set, which we refer to as the protocol's _Burst Threshold_. Instead of abruptly pausing staking and NoOp registration once the burst threshold is reached, Puffer introduces a mechanism to organically reduce staker demand as the protocol reaches the threshold.
 
-As the protocol reaches \(22\%\), the number of mintable validator tickets will be reduced such that it can only sustain existing validators but not new ones.
+As the protocol reaches 22\%, the number of mintable validator tickets will be reduced such that it can only sustain existing validators but not new ones.
 
-This pledge is critical to ensure that the Puffer protocol never breaches the [dangerous consensus threshold of \(33\%\)](https://x.com/dannyryan/status/1688644951230267392?s=46&t=bsdBaPIHlTHEWDDdVUJW4g), which threatens the stability of Ethereum. We firmly believe that the burst threshold must be included from day one rather than after the protocol is profitable.
+This pledge is critical to ensure that the Puffer protocol never breaches the [dangerous consensus threshold of 33\%](https://x.com/dannyryan/status/1688644951230267392?s=46&t=bsdBaPIHlTHEWDDdVUJW4g), which threatens the stability of Ethereum. We firmly believe that the burst threshold must be included from day one rather than after the protocol is profitable.
diff --git a/docs/yield/faq.md b/docs/yield/faq.md
@@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ slug: /reference/faq
 
 ### 🐊 Why don't other permissionless pools reduce their bond requirement to 2 ETH?
 
-> Reducing the bond requirement [increases node and staker risk](slash.md#liquid-staking-protocol-considerations) which Puffer mitigates through [Guardian support](./guardians.md). Also as the bond requirement decreases, the threat of "rug-pooling" increases, which Puffer's [Validator Tickets](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets#why--noop-incentives) address.
+> Reducing the bond requirement [increases node and staker risk](slash.md#liquid-staking-protocol-considerations) which Puffer mitigates through [Guardian support](./guardians.md). Also as the bond requirement decreases, the threat of "rug-pulling" increases, which Puffer's [Validator Tickets](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets#why--noop-incentives) address.
diff --git a/docs/yield/hardforks.md b/docs/yield/hardforks.md
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ its consensus layer to proof-of-stake (PoS). Validators replaced miners as the a
 the consensus protocol. This transition shifted the limiting resource from electricity and computational
 power to pure capital (32 ETH), significantly reducing Ethereum's energy footprint.
 
-The core principle of PoS is that validators with \(32\) ETH staked (worth approximately $60,000 USD at the time of writing) are incentivized to perform their consensus duties honestly or risk forfeiting their collateral or bond. The high capital requirement should make it infeasible for a centralized entity to acquire more than two-thirds of the validator set (a critical consensus threshold).
+The core principle of PoS is that validators with 32 ETH staked (worth approximately $60,000 USD at the time of writing) are incentivized to perform their consensus duties honestly or risk forfeiting their collateral or bond. The high capital requirement should make it infeasible for a centralized entity to acquire more than two-thirds of the validator set (a critical consensus threshold).
 
 Validators are incentivized to participate through consensus and execution rewards. Consensus rewards are earned by performing duties like attesting to the validity of proposed blocks and vary depending on factors like the validator's performance. Execution rewards are earned when the validator is randomly selected to propose a new block.
 
diff --git a/docs/yield/nlrt.md b/docs/yield/nlrt.md
@@ -57,32 +57,22 @@ Stakers deposit ETH to the PufferVault contract to mint the pufETH nLRT. At the
 
 #### Calculating the Conversion Rate
 
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 The conversion rate can be calculated simply as:
 
 $$
-\text{conversion rate} = \\frac{\text{deposits} + \text{rewards} - \text{penalties}}{\text{pufETH supply}}
+\text{conversion rate} = \frac{\text{deposits} + \text{rewards} - \text{penalties}}{\text{pufETH supply}}
 $$
 
 - `deposits` and `pufETH supply` increase proportionally as stakers deposit ETH to mint pufETH, leaving the `conversion rate` unaffected.
 
 - `rewards` increase as [restaking operators](/yield/protocol/puffer-modules#restaking-operators) run AVSs and whenever validator tickets are minted.
 
-- `penalties` accrue if validators are slashed on PoS for more than their \\(1\\) ETH collateral, which is [disincentivized behavior](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets#why--noop-incentives). Penalties can also accrue if the restaking operator is slashed running AVSs, which is why Puffer is [restricting restaking operator participation](/yield/protocol/puffer-modules#restricting-reops) during its nascent stages.
+- `penalties` accrue if validators are slashed on PoS for more than their $1$ ETH collateral, which is [disincentivized behavior](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets#why--noop-incentives). Penalties can also accrue if the restaking operator is slashed running AVSs, which is why Puffer is [restricting restaking operator participation](/yield/protocol/puffer-modules#restricting-reops) during its nascent stages.
 
 #### Example
 
-At the protocol's inception, Bob stakes \\(10\\) ETH and receives \\(10\\) pufETH. Then, after some time, the protocol earns \\(2\\) ETH of rewards by minting validator tickets and restaking. Now Bob's \\(10\\) pufETH is backed by \\(12\\) ETH, making the conversion rate \$
-\\frac{10+2-0}{10}=1.2\
-$ ETH per pufETH.
+At the protocol's inception, Bob stakes $10$ ETH and receives $10$ pufETH. Then, after some time, the protocol earns $2$ ETH of rewards by minting validator tickets and restaking. Now Bob's $10$ pufETH is backed by $12$ ETH, making the conversion rate $$\frac{10+2-0}{10}=1.2$$ ETH per pufETH.
 
-Assuming Charlie decides to stake \\(1\\) ETH, he would mint \$
-\\frac{1}{1.2} = 0.83\
-$ pufETH due to the increased conversion rate. Since Charlie deposited instead of adding rewards, the conversion rate remains unchanged at \$
-\\frac{11 + 2 - 0}{10.83} = 1.2\
-$ ETH per pufETH.
+Assuming Charlie decides to stake $1$ ETH, he would mint $$\frac{1}{1.2} = 0.83$$ pufETH due to the increased conversion rate. Since Charlie deposited instead of adding rewards, the conversion rate remains unchanged at $$\frac{11 + 2 - 0}{10.83} = 1.2$$ ETH per pufETH.
 
-Bob can redeem his \\(10\\) pufETH for \\(10*1.2=12\\) ETH, given there is enough liquidity in the PufferVault and the daily withdrawal limit has not been reached.
+Bob can redeem his $10$ pufETH for $10 \times 1.2 = 12$ ETH, given there is enough liquidity in the PufferVault and the daily withdrawal limit has not been reached.
diff --git a/docs/yield/noop-rewards.md b/docs/yield/noop-rewards.md
@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ To withdraw rewards, Node Operators need to sign a transaction on Base by follow
 
 5. Wait for the transaction confirmation. Once confirmed, you'll receive your rewards on Base.
 
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 ![Transaction Confirmed](/img/noop-rewards-5.png)
 
 After claiming the rewards, Node Operators can either bridge them back to Ethereum L1 or utilize them on Base L2.
diff --git a/docs/yield/overview.md b/docs/yield/overview.md
@@ -45,10 +45,6 @@ To register a new validator, NoOps deposit [validator tickets](/yield/protocol/v
 - Safeguard staker ETH
 - Increase NoOp profit margins
 
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 To ensure the safety of stakers, NoOps must distribute their encrypted validator keyshares to the Guardians' [enclaves](/yield/reference/glossary#enclave), allowing them to eject the NoOps if their validator balance falls too low or they run out of validator tickets. This requirement is to protect stakers and it will be [upgraded to a trustless solution](/yield/protocol/guardians#roadmap-to-decentralization) once Ethereum's protocol allows it via [EIP-7002](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7002).
 
 ---
diff --git a/docs/yield/privacy-policy.md b/docs/yield/privacy-policy.md
@@ -46,10 +46,6 @@ When you access our website, we and our service providers may obtain or request
 
 - In pursuance of our legitimate interests, or those of a third party to whom your personal data are disclosed, including:
   - complying with a legal, tax, accounting or regulatory obligation to which we or the third party are subject;
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
   - assessing and processing requests you make;
   - investigating any complaints, or pursuing or defending any claims, proceedings or disputes;
   - providing you with, and informing you about, products and services;
diff --git a/docs/yield/purchase-vt-using-safe.md b/docs/yield/purchase-vt-using-safe.md
@@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ Validator Tickets (VTs) allow you to participate in the Puffer Protocol as a nod
 
 7. Return to the Puffer LaunchPad. You should now see your Safe wallet connected and ready to purchase VTs. Click on `Continue` to move to the next step.
 
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
    ![Safe Multisig](/img/purchase-vt-1-step.png)
 
 ## Purchasing VTs with ETH
diff --git a/docs/yield/purchase-vts.md b/docs/yield/purchase-vts.md
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ This guide will walk you through the process of purchasing Validator Tickets (VT
    ![alt text](/img/purchase-vt-2-currency-select.png)
 
 4. Review the transaction details and click "Confirm"
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 
    ![alt text](/img/purchase-vt-3-transaction-submitted.png)
 
diff --git a/docs/yield/requirements.md b/docs/yield/requirements.md
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Becoming a Puffer NoOp requires running a validator. NoOps must lock a refundabl
 
 #### Bond and Validator Tickets
 
-The bond is required as slashing and inactivity insurance. The locked validator tickets act as an incentive alignment. The amount of validator tickets locked determines the length of time the NoOp is entitled to run the validator. Read more about validator tickets [here](./validator-tickets.md). The ETH bond will eventually be converted into pufETH, so NoOps can alternatively deposit their bond as pufETH. In either case, if the validator exits the beacon chain with at least \\(32\\) ETH, and was not slashed, the NoOp will receive the entirety of their bond back. If the validator was not slashed, but its balance is less than \\(32\\) ETH, the difference will come out of the NoOps bond.
+The bond is required as slashing and inactivity insurance. The locked validator tickets act as an incentive alignment. The amount of validator tickets locked determines the length of time the NoOp is entitled to run the validator. Read more about validator tickets [here](./validator-tickets.md). The ETH bond will eventually be converted into pufETH, so NoOps can alternatively deposit their bond as pufETH. In either case, if the validator exits the beacon chain with at least 32 ETH, and was not slashed, the NoOp will receive the entirety of their bond back. If the validator was not slashed, but its balance is less than 32 ETH, the difference will come out of the NoOps bond.
 
 :::warning
 If a validator is slashed, the NoOp will forfeit their entire bond.
@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ If a validator is slashed, the NoOp will forfeit their entire bond.
 - Storage: 2 TB SSD (NVMe SSD recommended) for full node
   - To run a full archive node, over 13.5 TB is needed
   - Note: As the Ethereum blockchain grows, about 14GB additional storage is needed per week
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 - Bandwidth: >= 25 Mbps download speed
 
 For more information, please see [Geth hardware requirements](https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/getting-started/hardware-requirements)
diff --git a/docs/yield/rewards.md b/docs/yield/rewards.md
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The protocol receives rewards from the [validator tickets](/yield/protocol/valid
 
 Due to validator tickets, **NoOps receive 100% of consensus rewards**. These consensus rewards are directed to the [withdrawal credentials](/yield/reference/glossary#withdrawal-credentials) which will, in this case, be the [module's EigenPod](/yield/protocol/puffer-modules). However, these rewards are not immediately accessible for withdrawal. After a delay, NoOps can withdraw their consensus rewards using a merkle rewards tree.
 
-:::caution EigenLayer Partial Withdrawals Proofs are being improved 🚧  
+:::caution EigenLayer Partial Withdrawals Proofs are being improved 🚧
 Currently it is [cost-prohibitive](https://docs.eigenlayer.xyz/eigenlayer/restaking-guides/restaking-user-guide/native-restaking/withdraw-from-eigenlayer/partial-withdrawals) to withdraw consensus rewards from EigenPods but the EigenLayer team is working to decrease these costs. Until then, withdrawing consensus rewards is temporarily disabled.
 :::
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Thanks to validator tickets, **NoOps also receive 100% of execution rewards**. T
 
 Restaking rewards are the fees derived from operating AVSs. While some protocols, like EigenDA, remit their payments in ETH and are straightforward to manage, others might use ERC20 tokens for payment. In such cases, these ERC20 rewards must be converted into ETH before being distributed to the Puffer protocol's participants.
 
-:::caution EigenLayer Specs not finalized 🚧  
+:::caution EigenLayer Specs not finalized 🚧
 EigenLayer is in active development with more detailed information regarding AVS payments coming soon.
 :::
 
@@ -61,11 +61,5 @@ EigenLayer is in active development with more detailed information regarding AVS
 [Validator Tickets](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets) cost ETH to mint and are allocated as follows:
 
 - Guardians are paid a fee to incentivize honest behavior and cover gas-fees.
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 - The treasury is allocated a portion as a protocol fee.
 - Stakers get the remainder deposited to the PufferVault.
-
----
diff --git a/docs/yield/setup.md b/docs/yield/setup.md
@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@ The Coral-CLI is used to generate validator keys, prepare registration payloads,
 ### Docker
 
 [Run using Docker](https://github.com/PufferFinance/coral/tree/main/docker)
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 
 ### Build from source
 
diff --git a/docs/yield/stake.md b/docs/yield/stake.md
@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ The Puffer Protocol app currently supports the following assets:
 You can select the amount of ETH, stETH, wstETH, or WETH you want to stake. The app will automatically calculate the amount of pufETH you will receive in return. The exchange rate will be the same for ETH, WETH and stETH since they are pegged 1:1. For wstETH, the exchange rate will be different.
 
 ![Select Amount](/img/stake/select_amount.png)
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
-{/* MDX-BLOCK-START */}
 
 To understand the exchange rate, check out the [docs](/yield/protocol/nlrt#calculating-the-conversion-rate).
 
diff --git a/docs/yield/terms-of-service.md b/docs/yield/terms-of-service.md
diff --git a/docs/yield/validator-tickets-calculation.md b/docs/yield/validator-tickets-calculation.md
diff --git a/docs/yield/validator-tickets.md b/docs/yield/validator-tickets.md
diff --git a/docs/yield/withdraw.md b/docs/yield/withdraw.md

Original file line number	Diff line number	Diff line change
`@@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ slug: /reference/faq`
`63`	`63`
`64`	`64`	`### 🐊 Why don't other permissionless pools reduce their bond requirement to 2 ETH?`
`65`	`65`
`66`		`-> Reducing the bond requirement [increases node and staker risk](slash.md#liquid-staking-protocol-considerations) which Puffer mitigates through [Guardian support](./guardians.md). Also as the bond requirement decreases, the threat of "rug-pooling" increases, which Puffer's [Validator Tickets](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets#why--noop-incentives) address.`
	`66`	`+> Reducing the bond requirement [increases node and staker risk](slash.md#liquid-staking-protocol-considerations) which Puffer mitigates through [Guardian support](./guardians.md). Also as the bond requirement decreases, the threat of "rug-pulling" increases, which Puffer's [Validator Tickets](/yield/protocol/validator-tickets#why--noop-incentives) address.`