Merge tag 'v2.43.4'

Git 2.43.4

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>

Author: dscho

.github/workflows/check-whitespace.yml

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
   check-whitespace:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       with:
         fetch-depth: 0
 

.github/workflows/main.yml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ jobs:
           echo "skip_concurrent=$skip_concurrent" >>$GITHUB_OUTPUT
       - name: skip if the commit or tree was already tested
         id: skip-if-redundant
-        uses: actions/github-script@v6
+        uses: actions/github-script@v7
         if: steps.check-ref.outputs.enabled == 'yes'
         with:
           github-token: ${{secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN}}
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ jobs:
       group: windows-build-${{ github.ref }}
       cancel-in-progress: ${{ needs.ci-config.outputs.skip_concurrent == 'yes' }}
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - uses: git-for-windows/setup-git-for-windows-sdk@v1
     - name: build
       shell: bash
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ jobs:
     - name: zip up tracked files
       run: git archive -o artifacts/tracked.tar.gz HEAD
     - name: upload tracked files and build artifacts
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: windows-artifacts
         path: artifacts
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ jobs:
       cancel-in-progress: ${{ needs.ci-config.outputs.skip_concurrent == 'yes' }}
     steps:
     - name: download tracked files and build artifacts
-      uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: windows-artifacts
         path: ${{github.workspace}}
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ jobs:
       run: ci/print-test-failures.sh
     - name: Upload failed tests' directories
       if: failure() && env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS != ''
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: failed-tests-windows
         path: ${{env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS}}
@@ -176,10 +176,10 @@ jobs:
       group: vs-build-${{ github.ref }}-${{ matrix.arch }}
       cancel-in-progress: ${{ needs.ci-config.outputs.skip_concurrent == 'yes' }}
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - uses: git-for-windows/setup-git-for-windows-sdk@v1
     - name: initialize vcpkg
-      uses: actions/checkout@v3
+      uses: actions/checkout@v4
       with:
         repository: 'microsoft/vcpkg'
         path: 'compat/vcbuild/vcpkg'
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ jobs:
     - name: zip up tracked files
       run: git archive -o artifacts/tracked.tar.gz HEAD
     - name: upload tracked files and build artifacts
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: vs-artifacts-${{ matrix.arch }}
         path: artifacts
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ jobs:
     steps:
     - uses: git-for-windows/setup-git-for-windows-sdk@v1
     - name: download tracked files and build artifacts
-      uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: vs-artifacts-x64
         path: ${{github.workspace}}
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ jobs:
       run: ci/print-test-failures.sh
     - name: Upload failed tests' directories
       if: failure() && env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS != ''
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: failed-tests-windows
         path: ${{env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS}}
@@ -296,15 +296,15 @@ jobs:
       runs_on_pool: ${{matrix.vector.pool}}
     runs-on: ${{matrix.vector.pool}}
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - run: ci/install-dependencies.sh
     - run: ci/run-build-and-tests.sh
     - name: print test failures
       if: failure() && env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS != ''
       run: ci/print-test-failures.sh
     - name: Upload failed tests' directories
       if: failure() && env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS != ''
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: failed-tests-${{matrix.vector.jobname}}
         path: ${{env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS}}
@@ -330,9 +330,9 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     container: ${{matrix.vector.image}}
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       if: matrix.vector.jobname != 'linux32'
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v1
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v1 # cannot be upgraded because Node.js Actions aren't supported in this container
       if: matrix.vector.jobname == 'linux32'
     - run: ci/install-docker-dependencies.sh
     - run: ci/run-build-and-tests.sh
@@ -341,13 +341,13 @@ jobs:
       run: ci/print-test-failures.sh
     - name: Upload failed tests' directories
       if: failure() && env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS != '' && matrix.vector.jobname != 'linux32'
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
       with:
         name: failed-tests-${{matrix.vector.jobname}}
         path: ${{env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS}}
     - name: Upload failed tests' directories
       if: failure() && env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS != '' && matrix.vector.jobname == 'linux32'
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v1
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v1 # cannot be upgraded because Node.js Actions aren't supported in this container
       with:
         name: failed-tests-${{matrix.vector.jobname}}
         path: ${{env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS}}
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ jobs:
       group: static-analysis-${{ github.ref }}
       cancel-in-progress: ${{ needs.ci-config.outputs.skip_concurrent == 'yes' }}
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - run: ci/install-dependencies.sh
     - run: ci/run-static-analysis.sh
     - run: ci/check-directional-formatting.bash
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ jobs:
         artifact: sparse-20.04
     - name: Install the current `sparse` package
       run: sudo dpkg -i sparse-20.04/sparse_*.deb
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - name: Install other dependencies
       run: ci/install-dependencies.sh
     - run: make sparse
@@ -399,6 +399,6 @@ jobs:
       jobname: Documentation
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - run: ci/install-dependencies.sh
     - run: ci/test-documentation.sh

Documentation/RelNotes/2.39.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+Git v2.39.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This addresses the security issues CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004,
+CVE-2024-32020 and CVE-2024-32021.
+
+This release also backports fixes necessary to let the CI builds pass
+successfully.
+
+Fixes since v2.39.3
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2024-32002:
+
+   Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
+   links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
+   execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
+
+ * CVE-2024-32004:
+
+   Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
+   clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
+   are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
+
+ * CVE-2024-32020:
+
+   Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
+   object database when source and target repository reside on the same
+   disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
+   those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
+   untrusted user.
+
+ * CVE-2024-32021:
+
+   When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
+   filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
+   on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
+   directory.
+
+ * CVE-2024-32465:
+
+   It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
+   unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
+   sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
+   clone.
+
+ * Defense-in-depth: submodule: require the submodule path to contain
+   directories only.
+
+ * Defense-in-depth: clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep
+   the latter.
+
+ * Defense-in-depth: clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone.
+
+ * Defense-in-depth: core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning.
+
+ * Defense-in-depth: fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir.
+
+ * Various fix-ups on HTTP tests.
+
+ * Test update.
+
+ * HTTP Header redaction code has been adjusted for a newer version of
+   cURL library that shows its traces differently from earlier
+   versions.
+
+ * Fix was added to work around a regression in libcURL 8.7.0 (which has
+   already been fixed in their tip of the tree).
+
+ * Replace macos-12 used at GitHub CI with macos-13.
+
+ * ci(linux-asan/linux-ubsan): let's save some time
+
+ * Tests with LSan from time to time seem to emit harmless message that makes
+   our tests unnecessarily flakey; we work it around by filtering the
+   uninteresting output.
+
+ * Update GitHub Actions jobs to avoid warnings against using deprecated
+   version of Node.js.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.40.2.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Git v2.40.2 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fix that appears in v2.39.4 to address
+the security issues CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004, CVE-2024-32020,
+CVE-2024-32021 and CVE-2024-32465; see the release notes for that
+version for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.41.1.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Git v2.41.1 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fix that appears in v2.39.4 and v2.40.2
+to address the security issues CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004,
+CVE-2024-32020, CVE-2024-32021 and CVE-2024-32465; see the release
+notes for these versions for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.42.2.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Git v2.42.2 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fix that appears in v2.39.4, v2.40.2
+and v2.41.1 to address the security issues CVE-2024-32002,
+CVE-2024-32004, CVE-2024-32020, CVE-2024-32021 and CVE-2024-32465;
+see the release notes for these versions for details.

Documentation/RelNotes/2.43.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Git v2.43.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges up the fix that appears in v2.39.4, v2.40.2,
+v2.41.1 and v2.42.2 to address the security issues CVE-2024-32002,
+CVE-2024-32004, CVE-2024-32020, CVE-2024-32021 and CVE-2024-32465;
+see the release notes for these versions for details.

Documentation/fsck-msgids.txt

@@ -164,6 +164,18 @@
 `nullSha1`::
 	(WARN) Tree contains entries pointing to a null sha1.
 
+`symlinkPointsToGitDir`::
+	(WARN) Symbolic link points inside a gitdir.
+
+`symlinkTargetBlob`::
+	(ERROR) A non-blob found instead of a symbolic link's target.
+
+`symlinkTargetLength`::
+	(WARN) Symbolic link target longer than maximum path length.
+
+`symlinkTargetMissing`::
+	(ERROR) Unable to read symbolic link target's blob.
+
 `treeNotSorted`::
 	(ERROR) A tree is not properly sorted.
 

Documentation/git-upload-pack.txt

@@ -55,6 +55,37 @@ ENVIRONMENT
 	admins may need to configure some transports to allow this
 	variable to be passed. See the discussion in linkgit:git[1].
 
+`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH`::
+	When cloning or fetching from a partial repository (i.e., one
+	itself cloned with `--filter`), the server-side `upload-pack`
+	may need to fetch extra objects from its upstream in order to
+	complete the request. By default, `upload-pack` will refuse to
+	perform such a lazy fetch, because `git fetch` may run arbitrary
+	commands specified in configuration and hooks of the source
+	repository (and `upload-pack` tries to be safe to run even in
+	untrusted `.git` directories).
++
+This is implemented by having `upload-pack` internally set the
+`GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` variable to `1`. If you want to override it
+(because you are fetching from a partial clone, and you are sure
+you trust it), you can explicitly set `GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH` to
+`0`.
+
+SECURITY
+--------
+
+Most Git commands should not be run in an untrusted `.git` directory
+(see the section `SECURITY` in linkgit:git[1]). `upload-pack` tries to
+avoid any dangerous configuration options or hooks from the repository
+it's serving, making it safe to clone an untrusted directory and run
+commands on the resulting clone.
+
+For an extra level of safety, you may be able to run `upload-pack` as an
+alternate user. The details will be platform dependent, but on many
+systems you can run:
+
+    git clone --no-local --upload-pack='sudo -u nobody git-upload-pack' ...
+
 SEE ALSO
 --------
 linkgit:gitnamespaces[7]

Documentation/git.txt

@@ -1052,6 +1052,37 @@ The index is also capable of storing multiple entries (called "stages")
 for a given pathname.  These stages are used to hold the various
 unmerged version of a file when a merge is in progress.
 
+SECURITY
+--------
+
+Some configuration options and hook files may cause Git to run arbitrary
+shell commands. Because configuration and hooks are not copied using
+`git clone`, it is generally safe to clone remote repositories with
+untrusted content, inspect them with `git log`, and so on.
+
+However, it is not safe to run Git commands in a `.git` directory (or
+the working tree that surrounds it) when that `.git` directory itself
+comes from an untrusted source. The commands in its config and hooks
+are executed in the usual way.
+
+By default, Git will refuse to run when the repository is owned by
+someone other than the user running the command. See the entry for
+`safe.directory` in linkgit:git-config[1]. While this can help protect
+you in a multi-user environment, note that you can also acquire
+untrusted repositories that are owned by you (for example, if you
+extract a zip file or tarball from an untrusted source). In such cases,
+you'd need to "sanitize" the untrusted repository first.
+
+If you have an untrusted `.git` directory, you should first clone it
+with `git clone --no-local` to obtain a clean copy. Git does restrict
+the set of options and hooks that will be run by `upload-pack`, which
+handles the server side of a clone or fetch, but beware that the
+surface area for attack against `upload-pack` is large, so this does
+carry some risk. The safest thing is to serve the repository as an
+unprivileged user (either via linkgit:git-daemon[1], ssh, or using
+other tools to change user ids). See the discussion in the `SECURITY`
+section of linkgit:git-upload-pack[1].
+
 FURTHER DOCUMENTATION
 ---------------------