Bluetooth: Add more enc key size check

When we are slave role and receives l2cap conn req when encryption has
started, we should check the enc key size to avoid KNOB attack or BLUFFS
attack.
From SIG recommendation, implementations are advised to reject
service-level connections on an encrypted baseband link with key
strengths below 7 octets.
A simple and clear way to achieve this is to place the enc key size
check in hci_cc_read_enc_key_size()

The btmon log below shows the case that lacks enc key size check.

> HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10
        Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
        Class: 0x480104
          Major class: Computer (desktop, notebook, PDA, organizers)
          Minor class: Desktop workstation
          Capturing (Scanner, Microphone)
          Telephony (Cordless telephony, Modem, Headset)
        Link type: ACL (0x01)
< HCI Command: Accept Connection Request (0x01|0x0009) plen 7
        Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
        Role: Peripheral (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
      Accept Connection Request (0x01|0x0009) ncmd 2
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 1
        Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
        Link type: ACL (0x01)
        Encryption: Disabled (0x00)
...

> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
< HCI Command: Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) plen 2
        Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7
      Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 2
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
        Key size: 6
// We should check the enc key size
...

> ACL Data RX: Handle 1 flags 0x02 dlen 12
      L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 3 len 4
        PSM: 25 (0x0019)
        Source CID: 64
< ACL Data TX: Handle 1 flags 0x00 dlen 16
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 64
        Result: Connection pending (0x0001)
        Status: Authorization pending (0x0002)
> HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
        Num handles: 1
        Handle: 1 Address: BB:22:33:44:55:99 (OUI BB-22-33)
        Count: 1
        #35: len 16 (25 Kb/s)
        Latency: 5 msec (2-7 msec ~4 msec)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 1 flags 0x00 dlen 16
      L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 3 len 8
        Destination CID: 64
        Source CID: 64
        Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
        Status: No further information available (0x0000)

Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Max Chou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
(backported from commit 04a342c)
[yuxuan.luo: manually backported. Renamed status to rp_status to avoid
 name conflict with the function argument "status".
]
CVE-2023-24023
Signed-off-by: Yuxuan Luo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jacob Martin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

Author: Alex Lu

net/bluetooth/hci_event.c

@@ -3113,6 +3113,7 @@ static void read_enc_key_size_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status,
 	const struct hci_rp_read_enc_key_size *rp;
 	struct hci_conn *conn;
 	u16 handle;
+	u8 rp_status;
 
 	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%02x", hdev->name, status);
 
@@ -3122,6 +3123,7 @@ static void read_enc_key_size_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status,
 	}
 
 	rp = (void *)skb->data;
+	rp_status = rp->status;
 	handle = le16_to_cpu(rp->handle);
 
 	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
@@ -3134,15 +3136,30 @@ static void read_enc_key_size_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status,
 	 * secure approach is to then assume the key size is 0 to force a
 	 * disconnection.
 	 */
-	if (rp->status) {
+	if (rp_status) {
 		bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to read key size for handle %u",
 			   handle);
 		conn->enc_key_size = 0;
 	} else {
 		conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size;
+		rp_status = 0;
+
+		if (conn->enc_key_size < hdev->min_enc_key_size) {
+			/* As slave role, the conn->state has been set to
+			 * BT_CONNECTED and l2cap conn req might not be received
+			 * yet, at this moment the l2cap layer almost does
+			 * nothing with the non-zero status.
+			 * So we also clear encrypt related bits, and then the
+			 * handler of l2cap conn req will get the right secure
+			 * state at a later time.
+			 */
+			rp_status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+			clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags);
+			clear_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags);
+		}
 	}
 
-	hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0);
+	hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, rp_status);
 
 unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);