Support 1024x600 resolution HDMI display

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-fsi-devices-sbefifo

@@ -5,6 +5,6 @@ Description:
 		Indicates whether or not this SBE device has experienced a
 		timeout; i.e. the SBE did not respond within the time allotted
 		by the driver. A value of 1 indicates that a timeout has
-		ocurred and no transfers have completed since the timeout. A
-		value of 0 indicates that no timeout has ocurred, or if one
-		has, more recent transfers have completed successful.
+		occurred and no transfers have completed since the timeout. A
+		value of 0 indicates that no timeout has occurred, or if one
+		has, more recent transfers have completed successfully.

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-optee-devices

@@ -6,3 +6,12 @@ Description:
 		OP-TEE bus provides reference to registered drivers under this directory. The <uuid>
 		matches Trusted Application (TA) driver and corresponding TA in secure OS. Drivers
 		are free to create needed API under optee-ta-<uuid> directory.
+
+What:		/sys/bus/tee/devices/optee-ta-<uuid>/need_supplicant
+Date:		November 2023
+KernelVersion:	6.7
+Contact:	[email protected]
+Description:
+		Allows to distinguish whether an OP-TEE based TA/device requires user-space
+		tee-supplicant to function properly or not. This attribute will be present for
+		devices which depend on tee-supplicant to be running.

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -513,17 +513,18 @@ Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 		cpu_capacity: capacity of cpuX.
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <[email protected]>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-chromeos-acpi

@@ -134,4 +134,4 @@ KernelVersion:	5.19
 Description:
 		Returns the verified boot data block shared between the
 		firmware verification step and the kernel verification step
-		(binary).
+		(hex dump).

Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst

@@ -91,8 +91,13 @@ Brief summary of control files.
  memory.oom_control		     set/show oom controls.
  memory.numa_stat		     show the number of memory usage per numa
 				     node
- memory.kmem.limit_in_bytes          This knob is deprecated and writing to
-                                     it will return -ENOTSUPP.
+ memory.kmem.limit_in_bytes          Deprecated knob to set and read the kernel
+                                     memory hard limit. Kernel hard limit is not
+                                     supported since 5.16. Writing any value to
+                                     do file will not have any effect same as if
+                                     nokmem kernel parameter was specified.
+                                     Kernel memory is still charged and reported
+                                     by memory.kmem.usage_in_bytes.
  memory.kmem.usage_in_bytes          show current kernel memory allocation
  memory.kmem.failcnt                 show the number of kernel memory usage
 				     hits limits

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+GDS - Gather Data Sampling
+==========================
+
+Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
+
+Problem
+-------
+When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
+are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
+instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
+architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
+destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
+infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
+attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
+
+The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
+registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
+vulnerable.
+
+Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
+are possible.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
+permission boundaries:
+
+	Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
+	Userspace can infer kernel data
+	Guests can infer data from hosts
+	Guest can infer guest from other guests
+	Users can infer data from other users
+
+Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
+lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
+
+The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should  ensure
+that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
+allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
+attack, and re-enable it.
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
+bits:
+
+ ================================   ===   ============================
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL]   R/O   Enumerates GDS vulnerability
+                                          and mitigation support.
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO]     R/O   Processor is not vulnerable.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS]    R/W   Disables the mitigation
+                                          0 by default.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK]   R/W   Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
+                                          to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
+                                          Can't be cleared once set.
+ ================================   ===   ============================
+
+GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
+"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
+
+If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
+However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support.  Userspace that
+does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
+support will break.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
+to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
+use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
+where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
+
+GDS System Information
+------------------------
+The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable.
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation.
+ Mitigation: AVX disabled,
+ no microcode                   Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect and cannot be disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on a virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+GDS Default mitigation
+----------------------
+The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
+default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -19,3 +19,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    l1d_flush.rst
    processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
    cross-thread-rsb.rst
+   gather_data_sampling.rst
+   srso

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO)
+========================================
+
+This is a mitigation for the speculative return stack overflow (SRSO)
+vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mechanism is by now the well
+known scenario of poisoning CPU functional units - the Branch Target
+Buffer (BTB) and Return Address Predictor (RAP) in this case - and then
+tricking the elevated privilege domain (the kernel) into leaking
+sensitive data.
+
+AMD CPUs predict RET instructions using a Return Address Predictor (aka
+Return Address Stack/Return Stack Buffer). In some cases, a non-architectural
+CALL instruction (i.e., an instruction predicted to be a CALL but is
+not actually a CALL) can create an entry in the RAP which may be used
+to predict the target of a subsequent RET instruction.
+
+The specific circumstances that lead to this varies by microarchitecture
+but the concern is that an attacker can mis-train the CPU BTB to predict
+non-architectural CALL instructions in kernel space and use this to
+control the speculative target of a subsequent kernel RET, potentially
+leading to information disclosure via a speculative side-channel.
+
+The issue is tracked under CVE-2023-20569.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+AMD Zen, generations 1-4. That is, all families 0x17 and 0x19. Older
+processors have not been investigated.
+
+System information and options
+------------------------------
+
+First of all, it is required that the latest microcode be loaded for
+mitigations to be effective.
+
+The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is:
+
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ - 'Not affected'               The processor is not vulnerable
+
+ - 'Vulnerable: no microcode'   The processor is vulnerable, no
+                                microcode extending IBPB functionality
+                                to address the vulnerability has been
+                                applied.
+
+ - 'Mitigation: microcode'      Extended IBPB functionality microcode
+                                patch has been applied. It does not
+                                address User->Kernel and Guest->Host
+                                transitions protection but it does
+                                address User->User and VM->VM attack
+                                vectors.
+
+                                (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode)
+
+ - 'Mitigation: safe RET'       Software-only mitigation. It complements
+                                the extended IBPB microcode patch
+                                functionality by addressing User->Kernel
+                                and Guest->Host transitions protection.
+
+                                Selected by default or by
+                                spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret
+
+ - 'Mitigation: IBPB'           Similar protection as "safe RET" above
+                                but employs an IBPB barrier on privilege
+                                domain crossings (User->Kernel,
+                                Guest->Host).
+
+                                (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb)
+
+ - 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT' Mitigation addressing the cloud provider
+                                scenario - the Guest->Host transitions
+                                only.
+
+                                (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit)
+
+In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to:
+
+ - gain local access on the machine
+
+ - break kASLR
+
+ - find gadgets in the running kernel in order to use them in the exploit
+
+ - potentially create and pin an additional workload on the sibling
+   thread, depending on the microarchitecture (not necessary on fam 0x19)
+
+ - run the exploit
+
+Considering the performance implications of each mitigation type, the
+default one is 'Mitigation: safe RET' which should take care of most
+attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one.
+
+As always, the user is advised to keep her/his system up-to-date by
+applying software updates regularly.
+
+The default setting will be reevaluated when needed and especially when
+new attack vectors appear.
+
+As one can surmise, 'Mitigation: safe RET' does come at the cost of some
+performance depending on the workload. If one trusts her/his userspace
+and does not want to suffer the performance impact, one can always
+disable the mitigation with spec_rstack_overflow=off.
+
+Similarly, 'Mitigation: IBPB' is another full mitigation type employing
+an indrect branch prediction barrier after having applied the required
+microcode patch for one's system. This mitigation comes also at
+a performance cost.
+
+Mitigation: safe RET
+--------------------
+
+The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
+a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
+retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
+the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
+sequence.
+
+To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
+safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
+and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
+untraining function srso_alias_untrain_ret() and the safe return
+function srso_alias_safe_ret() which results in evicting a potentially
+poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
+
+In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
+technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
+srso_safe_ret().