Fix pwm-gpio build error #40
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[ Upstream commit 3ccd54e ] When init states of the adapter work, the errors like lack of communication with the PF might hop in. If such events occur the driver restores previous states in order to retry initialization in a proper way. When remove task kicks in, this situation could lead to races with unregistering the netdevice as well as resources cleanup. With the commit introducing the waiting in remove for init to complete, this problem turns into an endless waiting if init never recovers from errors. Introduce __IAVF_IN_REMOVE_TASK bit to indicate that the remove thread has started. Make __IAVF_COMM_FAILED adapter state respect the __IAVF_IN_REMOVE_TASK bit and set the __IAVF_INIT_FAILED state and return without any action instead of trying to recover. Make __IAVF_INIT_FAILED adapter state respect the __IAVF_IN_REMOVE_TASK bit and return without any further actions. Make the loop in the remove handler break when adapter has __IAVF_INIT_FAILED state set. Fixes: 898ef1c ("iavf: Combine init and watchdog state machines") Signed-off-by: Slawomir Laba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Phani Burra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0579faf ] iavf_virtchnl_completion is called under crit_lock but when the code for VIRTCHNL_OP_GET_OFFLOAD_VLAN_V2_CAPS is called, this lock is released in order to obtain rtnl_lock to avoid ABBA deadlock with unregister_netdev. Along with the new way iavf_remove behaves, there exist many risks related to the lock release and attmepts to regrab it. The driver faces crashes related to races between unregister_netdev and netdev_update_features. Yet another risk is that the driver could already obtain the crit_lock in order to destroy it and iavf_virtchnl_completion could crash or block forever. Make iavf_virtchnl_completion never relock crit_lock in it's call paths. Extract rtnl_lock locking logic to the driver for unregister_netdev in order to set the netdev_registered flag inside the lock. Introduce a new flag that will inform adminq_task to perform the code from VIRTCHNL_OP_GET_OFFLOAD_VLAN_V2_CAPS right after it finishes processing messages. Guard this code with remove flags so it's never called when the driver is in remove state. Fixes: 5951a2b ("iavf: Fix VLAN feature flags after VFR") Signed-off-by: Slawomir Laba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Phani Burra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a472eb5 ] When iavf_init_version_check sends VIRTCHNL_OP_GET_VF_RESOURCES message, the driver will wait for the response after requeueing the watchdog task in iavf_init_get_resources call stack. The logic is implemented this way that iavf_init_get_resources has to be called in order to allocate adapter->vf_res. It is polling for the AQ response in iavf_get_vf_config function. Expect a call trace from kernel when adminq_task worker handles this message first. adapter->vf_res will be NULL in iavf_virtchnl_completion. Make the watchdog task not queue the adminq_task if the init process is not finished yet. Fixes: 898ef1c ("iavf: Combine init and watchdog state machines") Signed-off-by: Slawomir Laba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Phani Burra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 14756b2 ] The setup of __IAVF_RESETTING state in watchdog task had no effect and could lead to slow resets in the driver as the task for __IAVF_RESETTING state only requeues watchdog. Till now the __IAVF_RESETTING was interpreted by reset task as running state which could lead to errors with allocating and resources disposal. Make watchdog_task queue the reset task when it's necessary. Do not update the state to __IAVF_RESETTING so the reset task knows exactly what is the current state of the adapter. Fixes: 898ef1c ("iavf: Combine init and watchdog state machines") Signed-off-by: Slawomir Laba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Phani Burra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1b279f6 ] SLPC unset param H2G only needs one parameter - the id of the param. Fixes: 025cb07 ("drm/i915/guc/slpc: Cache platform frequency limits") Suggested-by: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ramalingam C <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 9648f1c) Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 26d3474 ] The PM Runtime docs say: Drivers in ->remove() callback should undo the runtime PM changes done in ->probe(). Usually this means calling pm_runtime_disable(), pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend() etc. We weren't doing that for autosuspend. Let's do it. Fixes: 9bede63 ("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Use pm_runtime autosuspend") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220222141838.1.If784ba19e875e8ded4ec4931601ce6d255845245@changeid Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1866aa0 ] Disable the OEM bit/Gig Disable/restart AN impact and disable the PHY LAN connected device (LCD) reset during power management flows. This fixes possible HW unit hangs on the s0ix exit on some corporate ADL platforms. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214821 Fixes: 3e55d23 ("e1000e: Add handshake with the CSME to support S0ix") Suggested-by: Dima Ruinskiy <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Nir Efrati <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Neftin <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5d89657 ] It was the intention to reverse the bits, not make them all zero by using logical NOT operator. Fixes: cc19db8 ("MIPS: ralink: mt7621: do memory detection on KSEG1") Suggested-by: Chuanhong Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sergio Paracuellos <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6ad27f5 ] As there's potential for failure of the nla_memdup(), check the return value. Fixes: a442b76 ("cfg80211: add add_nan_func / del_nan_func") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 90f8f4c ] In ("ptp: ocp: Have FPGA fold in ns adjustment for adjtime."), the ns adjustment was written to the FPGA register, so the clock could accurately perform adjustments. However, the adjtime() call passes in a s64, while the clock adjustment registers use a s32. When trying to perform adjustments with a large value (37 sec), things fail. Examine the incoming delta, and if larger than 1 sec, use the original (coarse) adjustment method. If smaller than 1 sec, then allow the FPGA to fold in the changes over a 1 second window. Fixes: 6d59d4f ("ptp: ocp: Have FPGA fold in ns adjustment for adjtime.") Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lemon <[email protected]> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f1ef170 ] Regression has been reported that suspend/resume may hang with the previous vm ready check commit. So bring back the evicted list check as a temp fix. Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/1922 Fixes: c1a66c3 ("drm/amdgpu: check vm ready by amdgpu_vm->evicting flag") Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Qiang Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 10b6bb6 ] Ido Schimmel points out that since commit 52cff74 ("dcbnl : Disable software interrupts before taking dcb_lock"), the DCB API can be called by drivers from softirq context. One such in-tree example is the chelsio cxgb4 driver: dcb_rpl -> cxgb4_dcb_handle_fw_update -> dcb_ieee_setapp If the firmware for this driver happened to send an event which resulted in a call to dcb_ieee_setapp() at the exact same time as another DCB-enabled interface was unregistering on the same CPU, the softirq would deadlock, because the interrupted process was already holding the dcb_lock in dcbnl_flush_dev(). Fix this unlikely event by using spin_lock_bh() in dcbnl_flush_dev() as in the rest of the dcbnl code. Fixes: 91b0383 ("net: dcb: flush lingering app table entries for unregistered devices") Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 196f9bc ] The test runs several test cases and is supposed to return an error in case at least one of them failed. Currently, the check of the return value of each test case is in the wrong place, which can result in the wrong return value. For example: # TESTS='tc_police' ./resource_scale.sh TEST: 'tc_police' [default] 968 [FAIL] tc police offload count failed Error: mlxsw_spectrum: Failed to allocate policer index. We have an error talking to the kernel Command failed /tmp/tmp.i7Oc5HwmXY:969 TEST: 'tc_police' [default] overflow 969 [ OK ] ... TEST: 'tc_police' [ipv4_max] overflow 969 [ OK ] $ echo $? 0 Fix this by moving the check to be done after each test case. Fixes: 059b18e ("selftests: mlxsw: Return correct error code in resource scale test") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
commit 61da6ac upstream. When XDP program is loaded, it is desirable that the previous TX and RX coalesce values are not re-inited to its default value. This prevents unnecessary re-configurig the coalesce values that were working fine before. Fixes: ac746c8 ("net: stmmac: enhance XDP ZC driver level switching performance") Signed-off-by: Ong Boon Leong <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…ble_power() commit 81a36d8 upstream. elan_disable_power() is called conditionally on suspend, where as elan_enable_power() is always called on resume. This leads to an imbalance in the regulator's enable count. Move the regulator_[en|dis]able() calls out of elan_[en|dis]able_power() in preparation of fixing this. No functional changes intended. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [dtor: consolidate elan_[en|dis]able() into elan_set_power()] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…resume commit 04b7762 upstream. Before these changes elan_suspend() would only disable the regulator when device_may_wakeup() returns false; whereas elan_resume() would unconditionally enable it, leading to an enable count imbalance when device_may_wakeup() returns true. This triggers the "WARN_ON(regulator->enable_count)" in regulator_put() when the elan_i2c driver gets unbound, this happens e.g. with the hot-plugable dock with Elan I2C touchpad for the Asus TF103C 2-in-1. Fix this by making the regulator_enable() call also be conditional on device_may_wakeup() returning false. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit ba115ad upstream. Make the samsung-keypad driver explicitly depend on CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM, as it calls devm_ioremap(). This prevents compile errors in some configs (e.g, allyesconfig/randconfig under UML): /usr/bin/ld: drivers/input/keyboard/samsung-keypad.o: in function `samsung_keypad_probe': samsung-keypad.c:(.text+0xc60): undefined reference to `devm_ioremap' Signed-off-by: David Gow <[email protected]> Acked-by: anton ivanov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit bfa26ba upstream. Numerous keyboards are adding dictate keys which allows for text messages to be dictated by a microphone. This patch adds a new key definition KEY_DICTATE and maps 0x0c/0x0d8 usage code to this new keycode. Additionally hid-debug is adjusted to recognize this new usage code as well. Signed-off-by: William Mahon <[email protected]> Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303021501.1.I5dbf50eb1a7a6734ee727bda4a8573358c6d3ec0@changeid Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 327b89f upstream. This patch adds a new key definition for KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS and aliases KEY_DASHBOARD to it. It also maps the 0x0c/0x2a2 usage code to KEY_ALL_APPLICATIONS. Signed-off-by: William Mahon <[email protected]> Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303035618.1.I3a7746ad05d270161a18334ae06e3b6db1a1d339@changeid Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 1d1898f upstream. When trying to add a histogram against an event with the "cpu" field, it was impossible due to "cpu" being a keyword to key off of the running CPU. So to fix this, it was changed to "common_cpu" to match the other generic fields (like "common_pid"). But since some scripts used "cpu" for keying off of the CPU (for events that did not have "cpu" as a field, which is most of them), a backward compatibility trick was added such that if "cpu" was used as a key, and the event did not have "cpu" as a field name, then it would fallback and switch over to "common_cpu". This fix has a couple of subtle bugs. One was that when switching over to "common_cpu", it did not change the field name, it just set a flag. But the code still found a "cpu" field. The "cpu" field is used for filtering and is returned when the event does not have a "cpu" field. This was found by: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo hist:key=cpu,pid:sort=cpu > events/sched/sched_wakeup/trigger # cat events/sched/sched_wakeup/hist Which showed the histogram unsorted: { cpu: 19, pid: 1175 } hitcount: 1 { cpu: 6, pid: 239 } hitcount: 2 { cpu: 23, pid: 1186 } hitcount: 14 { cpu: 12, pid: 249 } hitcount: 2 { cpu: 3, pid: 994 } hitcount: 5 Instead of hard coding the "cpu" checks, take advantage of the fact that trace_event_field_field() returns a special field for "cpu" and "CPU" if the event does not have "cpu" as a field. This special field has the "filter_type" of "FILTER_CPU". Check that to test if the returned field is of the CPU type instead of doing the string compare. Also, fix the sorting bug by testing for the hist_field flag of HIST_FIELD_FL_CPU when setting up the sort routine. Otherwise it will use the special CPU field to know what compare routine to use, and since that special field does not have a size, it returns tracing_map_cmp_none. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 1e3bac7 ("tracing/histogram: Rename "cpu" to "common_cpu"") Reported-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 1d02b44 upstream. __setup() handlers should generally return 1 to indicate that the boot options have been handled. Using invalid option values causes the entire kernel boot option string to be reported as Unknown and added to init's environment strings, polluting it. Unknown kernel command line parameters "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6 kprobe_event=p,syscall_any,$arg1 trace_options=quiet trace_clock=jiffies", will be passed to user space. Run /sbin/init as init process with arguments: /sbin/init with environment: HOME=/ TERM=linux BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6 kprobe_event=p,syscall_any,$arg1 trace_options=quiet trace_clock=jiffies Return 1 from the __setup() handlers so that init's environment is not polluted with kernel boot options. Link: lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 7bcfaf5 ("tracing: Add trace_options kernel command line parameter") Fixes: e1e232c ("tracing: Add trace_clock=<clock> kernel parameter") Fixes: 970988e ("tracing/kprobe: Add kprobe_event= boot parameter") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit d994788 upstream. When doing a full fsync, if we have prealloc extents beyond (or at) eof, and the leaves that contain them were not modified in the current transaction, we end up not logging them. This results in losing those extents when we replay the log after a power failure, since the inode is truncated to the current value of the logged i_size. Just like for the fast fsync path, we need to always log all prealloc extents starting at or beyond i_size. The fast fsync case was fixed in commit 471d557 ("Btrfs: fix loss of prealloc extents past i_size after fsync log replay") but it missed the full fsync path. The problem exists since the very early days, when the log tree was added by commit e02119d ("Btrfs: Add a write ahead tree log to optimize synchronous operations"). Example reproducer: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt # Create our test file with many file extent items, so that they span # several leaves of metadata, even if the node/page size is 64K. Use # direct IO and not fsync/O_SYNC because it's both faster and it avoids # clearing the full sync flag from the inode - we want the fsync below # to trigger the slow full sync code path. $ xfs_io -f -d -c "pwrite -b 4K 0 16M" /mnt/foo # Now add two preallocated extents to our file without extending the # file's size. One right at i_size, and another further beyond, leaving # a gap between the two prealloc extents. $ xfs_io -c "falloc -k 16M 1M" /mnt/foo $ xfs_io -c "falloc -k 20M 1M" /mnt/foo # Make sure everything is durably persisted and the transaction is # committed. This makes all created extents to have a generation lower # than the generation of the transaction used by the next write and # fsync. sync # Now overwrite only the first extent, which will result in modifying # only the first leaf of metadata for our inode. Then fsync it. This # fsync will use the slow code path (inode full sync bit is set) because # it's the first fsync since the inode was created/loaded. $ xfs_io -c "pwrite 0 4K" -c "fsync" /mnt/foo # Extent list before power failure. $ xfs_io -c "fiemap -v" /mnt/foo /mnt/foo: EXT: FILE-OFFSET BLOCK-RANGE TOTAL FLAGS 0: [0..7]: 2178048..2178055 8 0x0 1: [8..16383]: 26632..43007 16376 0x0 2: [16384..32767]: 2156544..2172927 16384 0x0 3: [32768..34815]: 2172928..2174975 2048 0x800 4: [34816..40959]: hole 6144 5: [40960..43007]: 2174976..2177023 2048 0x801 <power fail> # Mount fs again, trigger log replay. $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt # Extent list after power failure and log replay. $ xfs_io -c "fiemap -v" /mnt/foo /mnt/foo: EXT: FILE-OFFSET BLOCK-RANGE TOTAL FLAGS 0: [0..7]: 2178048..2178055 8 0x0 1: [8..16383]: 26632..43007 16376 0x0 2: [16384..32767]: 2156544..2172927 16384 0x1 # The prealloc extents at file offsets 16M and 20M are missing. So fix this by calling btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() when we are doing a full fsync, so that we always log all prealloc extents beyond eof. A test case for fstests will follow soon. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…_transaction() commit 5fd76bf upstream. We are seeing crashes similar to the following trace: [38.969182] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2105 at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4070 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2dc/0x340 [btrfs] [38.973556] CPU: 20 PID: 2105 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4 torvalds#54 [38.974580] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [38.976539] RIP: 0010:btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2dc/0x340 [btrfs] [38.980336] RSP: 0000:ffffb0dd42e03c20 EFLAGS: 00010206 [38.981218] RAX: ffff96cfc4ede800 RBX: ffff96cfc3ce0000 RCX: 000000000002ca14 [38.982560] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 4cfd109a0bcb5d7f RDI: ffff96cfc3ce0360 [38.983619] RBP: ffff96cfc309c000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [38.984678] R10: ffff96cec0000001 R11: ffffe84c80000000 R12: ffff96cfc4ede800 [38.985735] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff96cfc3ce0360 [38.987146] FS: 00007f11c15218c0(0000) GS:ffff96d6dfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [38.988662] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [38.989398] CR2: 00007ffc922c8e60 CR3: 00000001147a6001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [38.990279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [38.991219] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [38.992528] Call Trace: [38.992854] <TASK> [38.993148] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0 [btrfs] [38.993941] btrfs_balance+0x78e/0xea0 [btrfs] [38.994801] ? vsnprintf+0x33c/0x520 [38.995368] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x351/0x440 [38.996198] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2b9/0x3a0 [btrfs] [38.997084] btrfs_ioctl+0x11b0/0x2da0 [btrfs] [38.997867] ? mod_objcg_state+0xee/0x340 [38.998552] ? seq_release+0x24/0x30 [38.999184] ? proc_nr_files+0x30/0x30 [38.999654] ? call_rcu+0xc8/0x2f0 [39.000228] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 [39.000872] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [39.001973] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 [39.002566] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [39.003011] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [39.003735] RIP: 0033:0x7f11c166959b [39.007324] RSP: 002b:00007fff2543e998 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [39.008521] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f11c1521698 RCX: 00007f11c166959b [39.009833] RDX: 00007fff2543ea40 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [39.011270] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 00007f11c16f94e0 [39.012581] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff25440df3 [39.014046] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff2543ea40 R15: 0000000000000001 [39.015040] </TASK> [39.015418] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [43.131559] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [43.132234] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2717! [43.133031] invalid opcode: 0000 [tobetter#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [43.133702] CPU: 1 PID: 1839 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc4 torvalds#54 [43.134863] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [43.136426] RIP: 0010:unpin_extent_range+0x37a/0x4f0 [btrfs] [43.139913] RSP: 0000:ffffb0dd4216bc70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [43.140629] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96cfc34490f8 RCX: 0000000000000001 [43.141604] RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: 0000000051d00000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [43.142645] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff96cfd07dca50 [43.143669] R10: ffff96cfc46e8a00 R11: fffffffffffec000 R12: 0000000041d00000 [43.144657] R13: ffff96cfc3ce0000 R14: ffffb0dd4216bd08 R15: 0000000000000000 [43.145686] FS: 00007f7657dd68c0(0000) GS:ffff96d6df640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [43.146808] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [43.147584] CR2: 00007f7fe81bf5b0 CR3: 00000001093ee004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [43.148589] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [43.149581] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [43.150559] Call Trace: [43.150904] <TASK> [43.151253] btrfs_finish_extent_commit+0x88/0x290 [btrfs] [43.152127] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x74f/0xaa0 [btrfs] [43.152932] ? btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x1e/0x50 [btrfs] [43.153786] btrfs_ioctl+0x1edc/0x2da0 [btrfs] [43.154475] ? __check_object_size+0x150/0x170 [43.155170] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [43.155753] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 [43.156437] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [43.157456] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 [43.157980] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [43.158543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [43.159231] RIP: 0033:0x7f7657f1e59b [43.161819] RSP: 002b:00007ffda5cd1658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [43.162702] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f7657f1e59b [43.163526] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000009408 RDI: 0000000000000003 [43.164358] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [43.165208] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [43.166029] R13: 00005621b91c3232 R14: 00005621b91ba580 R15: 00007ffda5cd1800 [43.166863] </TASK> [43.167125] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor pata_acpi ata_piix libata raid6_pq scsi_mod libcrc32c virtio_net virtio_rng net_failover rng_core failover scsi_common [43.169552] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [43.171226] RIP: 0010:unpin_extent_range+0x37a/0x4f0 [btrfs] [43.174767] RSP: 0000:ffffb0dd4216bc70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [43.175600] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96cfc34490f8 RCX: 0000000000000001 [43.176468] RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: 0000000051d00000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [43.177357] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff96cfd07dca50 [43.178271] R10: ffff96cfc46e8a00 R11: fffffffffffec000 R12: 0000000041d00000 [43.179178] R13: ffff96cfc3ce0000 R14: ffffb0dd4216bd08 R15: 0000000000000000 [43.180071] FS: 00007f7657dd68c0(0000) GS:ffff96d6df800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [43.181073] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [43.181808] CR2: 00007fe09905f010 CR3: 00000001093ee004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [43.182706] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [43.183591] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 We first hit the WARN_ON(rc->block_group->pinned > 0) in btrfs_relocate_block_group() and then the BUG_ON(!cache) in unpin_extent_range(). This tells us that we are exiting relocation and removing the block group with bytes still pinned for that block group. This is supposed to be impossible: the last thing relocate_block_group() does is commit the transaction to get rid of pinned extents. Commit d0c2f4f ("btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when waiting for a transaction commit") introduced an optimization so that commits from fsync don't have to wait for the previous commit to unpin extents. This was only intended to affect fsync, but it inadvertently made it possible for any commit to skip waiting for the previous commit to unpin. This is because if a call to btrfs_commit_transaction() finds that another thread is already committing the transaction, it waits for the other thread to complete the commit and then returns. If that other thread was in fsync, then it completes the commit without completing the previous commit. This makes the following sequence of events possible: Thread 1____________________|Thread 2 (fsync)_____________________|Thread 3 (balance)___________________ btrfs_commit_transaction(N) | | btrfs_run_delayed_refs | | pin extents | | ... | | state = UNBLOCKED |btrfs_sync_file | | btrfs_start_transaction(N + 1) |relocate_block_group | | btrfs_join_transaction(N + 1) | btrfs_commit_transaction(N + 1) | ... | trans->state = COMMIT_START | | | btrfs_commit_transaction(N + 1) | | wait_for_commit(N + 1, COMPLETED) | wait_for_commit(N, SUPER_COMMITTED)| state = SUPER_COMMITTED | ... | btrfs_finish_extent_commit| | unpin_extent_range() | trans->state = COMPLETED | | | return | | ... | |Thread 1 isn't done, so pinned > 0 | |and we WARN | | | |btrfs_remove_block_group unpin_extent_range() | | Thread 3 removed the | | block group, so we BUG| | There are other sequences involving SUPER_COMMITTED transactions that can cause a similar outcome. We could fix this by making relocation explicitly wait for unpinning, but there may be other cases that need it. Josef mentioned ENOSPC flushing and the free space cache inode as other potential victims. Rather than playing whack-a-mole, this fix is conservative and makes all commits not in fsync wait for all previous transactions, which is what the optimization intended. Fixes: d0c2f4f ("btrfs: make concurrent fsyncs wait less when waiting for a transaction commit") CC: [email protected] # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit c992fa1 upstream. [BUG] When looping btrfs/074 with 64K page size and 4K sectorsize, there is a low chance (1/50~1/100) to crash with the following ASSERT() triggered in btrfs_subpage_start_writer(): ret = atomic_add_return(nbits, &subpage->writers); ASSERT(ret == nbits); <<< This one <<< [CAUSE] With more debugging output on the parameters of btrfs_subpage_start_writer(), it shows a very concerning error: ret=29 nbits=13 start=393216 len=53248 For @nbits it's correct, but @ret which is the returned value from atomic_add_return(), it's not only larger than nbits, but also larger than max sectors per page value (for 64K page size and 4K sector size, it's 16). This indicates that some call sites are not properly decreasing the value. And that's exactly the case, in btrfs_page_unlock_writer(), due to the fact that we can have page locked either by lock_page() or process_one_page(), we have to check if the subpage has any writer. If no writers, it's locked by lock_page() and we only need to unlock it. But unfortunately the check for the writers are completely opposite: if (atomic_read(&subpage->writers)) /* No writers, locked by plain lock_page() */ return unlock_page(page); We directly unlock the page if it has writers, which is the completely opposite what we want. Thankfully the affected call site is only limited to extent_write_locked_range(), so it's mostly affecting compressed write. [FIX] Just fix the wrong check condition to fix the bug. Fixes: e55a0de ("btrfs: rework page locking in __extent_writepage()") CC: [email protected] # 5.16 Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit a50e1fc upstream. Whenever we do any extent buffer operations we call assert_eb_page_uptodate() to complain loudly if we're operating on an non-uptodate page. Our overnight tests caught this warning earlier this week WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 553508 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:6849 assert_eb_page_uptodate+0x3f/0x50 CPU: 1 PID: 553508 Comm: kworker/u4:13 Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc3+ torvalds#564 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_work_helper RIP: 0010:assert_eb_page_uptodate+0x3f/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffffa961440a7c68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0017ffffc0002112 RBX: ffffe6e74453f9c0 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: ffffe6e74467c887 RSI: ffffe6e74453f9c0 RDI: ffff8d4c5efc2fc0 RBP: 0000000000000d56 R08: ffff8d4d4a224000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00015817fa9d1ef0 R11: 000000000000000c R12: 00000000000007b1 R13: ffff8d4c5efc2fc0 R14: 0000000001500000 R15: 0000000001cb1000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d4dbbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ff31d3448d8 CR3: 0000000118be8004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 Call Trace: extent_buffer_test_bit+0x3f/0x70 free_space_test_bit+0xa6/0xc0 load_free_space_tree+0x1f6/0x470 caching_thread+0x454/0x630 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60 ? lock_release+0x1f0/0x2d0 btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0 ? lock_release+0x1f0/0x2d0 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xf9/0x3a0 process_one_work+0x26d/0x580 ? process_one_work+0x580/0x580 worker_thread+0x55/0x3b0 ? process_one_work+0x580/0x580 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This was partially fixed by c2e3930 ("btrfs: clear extent buffer uptodate when we fail to write it"), however all that fix did was keep us from finding extent buffers after a failed writeout. It didn't keep us from continuing to use a buffer that we already had found. In this case we're searching the commit root to cache the block group, so we can start committing the transaction and switch the commit root and then start writing. After the switch we can look up an extent buffer that hasn't been written yet and start processing that block group. Then we fail to write that block out and clear Uptodate on the page, and then we start spewing these errors. Normally we're protected by the tree lock to a certain degree here. If we read a block we have that block read locked, and we block the writer from locking the block before we submit it for the write. However this isn't necessarily fool proof because the read could happen before we do the submit_bio and after we locked and unlocked the extent buffer. Also in this particular case we have path->skip_locking set, so that won't save us here. We'll simply get a block that was valid when we read it, but became invalid while we were using it. What we really want is to catch the case where we've "read" a block but it's not marked Uptodate. On read we ClearPageError(), so if we're !Uptodate and !Error we know we didn't do the right thing for reading the page. Fix this by checking !Uptodate && !Error, this way we will not complain if our buffer gets invalidated while we're using it, and we'll maintain the spirit of the check which is to make sure we have a fully in-cache block while we're messing with it. CC: [email protected] # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit d4aef1e upstream. The commit e804861 ("btrfs: fix deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker") by Kawasaki resolves deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker. But also there is a deadlock case like it. It's about enabling or disabling quota and creating or removing qgroup. It can be reproduced in simple script below. for i in {1..100} do btrfs quota enable /mnt & btrfs qgroup create 1/0 /mnt & btrfs qgroup destroy 1/0 /mnt & btrfs quota disable /mnt & done Here's why the deadlock happens: 1) The quota rescan task is running. 2) Task A calls btrfs_quota_disable(), locks the qgroup_ioctl_lock mutex, and then calls btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(), to wait for the quota rescan task to complete. 3) Task B calls btrfs_remove_qgroup() and it blocks when trying to lock the qgroup_ioctl_lock mutex, because it's being held by task A. At that point task B is holding a transaction handle for the current transaction. 4) The quota rescan task calls btrfs_commit_transaction(). This results in it waiting for all other tasks to release their handles on the transaction, but task B is blocked on the qgroup_ioctl_lock mutex while holding a handle on the transaction, and that mutex is being held by task A, which is waiting for the quota rescan task to complete, resulting in a deadlock between these 3 tasks. To resolve this issue, the thread disabling quota should unlock qgroup_ioctl_lock before waiting rescan completion. Move btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion() after unlock of qgroup_ioctl_lock. Fixes: e804861 ("btrfs: fix deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker") CC: [email protected] # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sidong Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 4751dc9 upstream. During log replay, whenever we need to check if a name (dentry) exists in a directory we do searches on the subvolume tree for inode references or or directory entries (BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY keys, and BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY keys as well, before kernel 5.17). However when during log replay we unlink a name, through btrfs_unlink_inode(), we may not delete inode references and dir index keys from a subvolume tree and instead just add the deletions to the delayed inode's delayed items, which will only be run when we commit the transaction used for log replay. This means that after an unlink operation during log replay, if we attempt to search for the same name during log replay, we will not see that the name was already deleted, since the deletion is recorded only on the delayed items. We run delayed items after every unlink operation during log replay, except at unlink_old_inode_refs() and at add_inode_ref(). This was due to an overlook, as delayed items should be run after evert unlink, for the reasons stated above. So fix those two cases. Fixes: 0d83639 ("Btrfs: fix mount failure after fsync due to hard link recreation") Fixes: 1f250e9 ("Btrfs: fix log replay failure after unlink and link combination") CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…xtents commit ca93e44 upstream. Some users recently reported that MariaDB was getting a read corruption when using io_uring on top of btrfs. This started to happen in 5.16, after commit 51bd956 ("btrfs: fix deadlock due to page faults during direct IO reads and writes"). That changed btrfs to use the new iomap flag IOMAP_DIO_PARTIAL and to disable page faults before calling iomap_dio_rw(). This was necessary to fix deadlocks when the iovector corresponds to a memory mapped file region. That type of scenario is exercised by test case generic/647 from fstests. For this MariaDB scenario, we attempt to read 16K from file offset X using IOCB_NOWAIT and io_uring. In that range we have 4 extents, each with a size of 4K, and what happens is the following: 1) btrfs_direct_read() disables page faults and calls iomap_dio_rw(); 2) iomap creates a struct iomap_dio object, its reference count is initialized to 1 and its ->size field is initialized to 0; 3) iomap calls btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() with file offset X, which finds the first 4K extent, and setups an iomap for this extent consisting of a single page; 4) At iomap_dio_bio_iter(), we are able to access the first page of the buffer (struct iov_iter) with bio_iov_iter_get_pages() without triggering a page fault; 5) iomap submits a bio for this 4K extent (iomap_dio_submit_bio() -> btrfs_submit_direct()) and increments the refcount on the struct iomap_dio object to 2; The ->size field of the struct iomap_dio object is incremented to 4K; 6) iomap calls btrfs_iomap_begin() again, this time with a file offset of X + 4K. There we setup an iomap for the next extent that also has a size of 4K; 7) Then at iomap_dio_bio_iter() we call bio_iov_iter_get_pages(), which tries to access the next page (2nd page) of the buffer. This triggers a page fault and returns -EFAULT; 8) At __iomap_dio_rw() we see the -EFAULT, but we reset the error to 0 because we passed the flag IOMAP_DIO_PARTIAL to iomap and the struct iomap_dio object has a ->size value of 4K (we submitted a bio for an extent already). The 'wait_for_completion' variable is not set to true, because our iocb has IOCB_NOWAIT set; 9) At the bottom of __iomap_dio_rw(), we decrement the reference count of the struct iomap_dio object from 2 to 1. Because we were not the only ones holding a reference on it and 'wait_for_completion' is set to false, -EIOCBQUEUED is returned to btrfs_direct_read(), which just returns it up the callchain, up to io_uring; 10) The bio submitted for the first extent (step 5) completes and its bio endio function, iomap_dio_bio_end_io(), decrements the last reference on the struct iomap_dio object, resulting in calling iomap_dio_complete_work() -> iomap_dio_complete(). 11) At iomap_dio_complete() we adjust the iocb->ki_pos from X to X + 4K and return 4K (the amount of io done) to iomap_dio_complete_work(); 12) iomap_dio_complete_work() calls the iocb completion callback, iocb->ki_complete() with a second argument value of 4K (total io done) and the iocb with the adjust ki_pos of X + 4K. This results in completing the read request for io_uring, leaving it with a result of 4K bytes read, and only the first page of the buffer filled in, while the remaining 3 pages, corresponding to the other 3 extents, were not filled; 13) For the application, the result is unexpected because if we ask to read N bytes, it expects to get N bytes read as long as those N bytes don't cross the EOF (i_size). MariaDB reports this as an error, as it's not expecting a short read, since it knows it's asking for read operations fully within the i_size boundary. This is typical in many applications, but it may also be questionable if they should react to such short reads by issuing more read calls to get the remaining data. Nevertheless, the short read happened due to a change in btrfs regarding how it deals with page faults while in the middle of a read operation, and there's no reason why btrfs can't have the previous behaviour of returning the whole data that was requested by the application. The problem can also be triggered with the following simple program: /* Get O_DIRECT */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <liburing.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *foo_path; struct io_uring ring; struct io_uring_sqe *sqe; struct io_uring_cqe *cqe; struct iovec iovec; int fd; long pagesize; void *write_buf; void *read_buf; ssize_t ret; int i; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <directory>\n", argv[0]); return 1; } foo_path = malloc(strlen(argv[1]) + 5); if (!foo_path) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate memory for file path\n"); return 1; } strcpy(foo_path, argv[1]); strcat(foo_path, "/foo"); /* * Create file foo with 2 extents, each with a size matching * the page size. Then allocate a buffer to read both extents * with io_uring, using O_DIRECT and IOCB_NOWAIT. Before doing * the read with io_uring, access the first page of the buffer * to fault it in, so that during the read we only trigger a * page fault when accessing the second page of the buffer. */ fd = open(foo_path, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_DIRECT, 0666); if (fd == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create file 'foo': %s (errno %d)", strerror(errno), errno); return 1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, 2 * pagesize); if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate write buffer\n"); return 1; } memset(write_buf, 0xab, pagesize); memset(write_buf + pagesize, 0xcd, pagesize); /* Create 2 extents, each with a size matching page size. */ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { ret = pwrite(fd, write_buf + i * pagesize, pagesize, i * pagesize); if (ret != pagesize) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to write to file, ret = %ld errno %d (%s)\n", ret, errno, strerror(errno)); return 1; } ret = fsync(fd); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to fsync file\n"); return 1; } } close(fd); fd = open(foo_path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT); if (fd == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open file 'foo': %s (errno %d)", strerror(errno), errno); return 1; } ret = posix_memalign(&read_buf, pagesize, 2 * pagesize); if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate read buffer\n"); return 1; } /* * Fault in only the first page of the read buffer. * We want to trigger a page fault for the 2nd page of the * read buffer during the read operation with io_uring * (O_DIRECT and IOCB_NOWAIT). */ memset(read_buf, 0, 1); ret = io_uring_queue_init(1, &ring, 0); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create io_uring queue\n"); return 1; } sqe = io_uring_get_sqe(&ring); if (!sqe) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get io_uring sqe\n"); return 1; } iovec.iov_base = read_buf; iovec.iov_len = 2 * pagesize; io_uring_prep_readv(sqe, fd, &iovec, 1, 0); ret = io_uring_submit_and_wait(&ring, 1); if (ret != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed at io_uring_submit_and_wait()\n"); return 1; } ret = io_uring_wait_cqe(&ring, &cqe); if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed at io_uring_wait_cqe()\n"); return 1; } printf("io_uring read result for file foo:\n\n"); printf(" cqe->res == %d (expected %d)\n", cqe->res, 2 * pagesize); printf(" memcmp(read_buf, write_buf) == %d (expected 0)\n", memcmp(read_buf, write_buf, 2 * pagesize)); io_uring_cqe_seen(&ring, cqe); io_uring_queue_exit(&ring); return 0; } When running it on an unpatched kernel: $ gcc io_uring_test.c -luring $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sda $ mount /dev/sda /mnt/sda $ ./a.out /mnt/sda io_uring read result for file foo: cqe->res == 4096 (expected 8192) memcmp(read_buf, write_buf) == -205 (expected 0) After this patch, the read always returns 8192 bytes, with the buffer filled with the correct data. Although that reproducer always triggers the bug in my test vms, it's possible that it will not be so reliable on other environments, as that can happen if the bio for the first extent completes and decrements the reference on the struct iomap_dio object before we do the atomic_dec_and_test() on the reference at __iomap_dio_rw(). Fix this in btrfs by having btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() return -EAGAIN whenever we try to satisfy a non blocking IO request (IOMAP_NOWAIT flag set) over a range that spans multiple extents (or a mix of extents and holes). This avoids returning success to the caller when we only did partial IO, which is not optimal for writes and for reads it's actually incorrect, as the caller doesn't expect to get less bytes read than it has requested (unless EOF is crossed), as previously mentioned. This is also the type of behaviour that xfs follows (xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin()), even though it doesn't use IOMAP_DIO_PARTIAL. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CABVffEM0eEWho+206m470rtM0d9J8ue85TtR-A_oVTuGLWFicA@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAHF2GV6U32gmqSjLe=XKgfcZAmLCiH26cJ2OnHGp5x=VAH4OHQ@mail.gmail.com/ CC: [email protected] # 5.16+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b4be6ae upstream. We hit a bug with a recovering relocation on mount for one of our file systems in production. I reproduced this locally by injecting errors into snapshot delete with balance running at the same time. This presented as an error while looking up an extent item WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1501 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:866 lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 CPU: 5 PID: 1501 Comm: btrfs-balance Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8+ tobetter#8 RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 RSP: 0018:ffffae0a023ab960 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff943fd2a39b60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0001434088152de0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000001d05000 R13: ffff943fd2a39b60 R14: ffff943fdb96f2a0 R15: ffff9442fc923000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff944e9eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1157b1fca8 CR3: 000000010f092000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> insert_inline_extent_backref+0x46/0xd0 __btrfs_inc_extent_ref.isra.0+0x5f/0x200 ? btrfs_merge_delayed_refs+0x164/0x190 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x561/0xfa0 ? btrfs_search_slot+0x7b4/0xb30 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x73/0x1f0 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x50/0xa50 ? btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x122/0x220 prepare_to_merge+0x29f/0x320 relocate_block_group+0x2b8/0x550 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x1a6/0x350 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0 btrfs_balance+0x777/0xe60 balance_kthread+0x35/0x50 ? btrfs_balance+0xe60/0xe60 kthread+0x16b/0x190 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Normally snapshot deletion and relocation are excluded from running at the same time by the fs_info->cleaner_mutex. However if we had a pending balance waiting to get the ->cleaner_mutex, and a snapshot deletion was running, and then the box crashed, we would come up in a state where we have a half deleted snapshot. Again, in the normal case the snapshot deletion needs to complete before relocation can start, but in this case relocation could very well start before the snapshot deletion completes, as we simply add the root to the dead roots list and wait for the next time the cleaner runs to clean up the snapshot. Fix this by setting a bit on the fs_info if we have any DEAD_ROOT's that had a pending drop_progress key. If they do then we know we were in the middle of the drop operation and set a flag on the fs_info. Then balance can wait until this flag is cleared to start up again. If there are DEAD_ROOT's that don't have a drop_progress set then we're safe to start balance right away as we'll be properly protected by the cleaner_mutex. CC: [email protected] # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit a6d95c5 upstream. This reverts commit b515d26. Commit b515d26 ("xfrm: xfrm_state_mtu should return at least 1280 for ipv6") in v5.14 breaks the TCP MSS calculation in ipsec transport mode, resulting complete stalls of TCP connections. This happens when the (P)MTU is 1280 or slighly larger. The desired formula for the MSS is: MSS = (MTU - ESP_overhead) - IP header - TCP header However, the above commit clamps the (MTU - ESP_overhead) to a minimum of 1280, turning the formula into MSS = max(MTU - ESP overhead, 1280) - IP header - TCP header With the (P)MTU near 1280, the calculated MSS is too large and the resulting TCP packets never make it to the destination because they are over the actual PMTU. The above commit also causes suboptimal double fragmentation in xfrm tunnel mode, as described in https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ The original problem the above commit was trying to fix is now fixed by commit 6596a02 ("xfrm: fix MTU regression"). Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 11c57c3 ] Resending this to properly add it to the patch tracker - thanks for letting me know, Arnd :) When ARM is enabled, and BITREVERSE is disabled, Kbuild gives the following warning: WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE Depends on [n]: BITREVERSE [=n] Selected by [y]: - ARM [=y] && (CPU_32v7M [=n] || CPU_32v7 [=y]) && !CPU_32v6 [=n] This is because ARM selects HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE without selecting BITREVERSE, despite HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE depending on BITREVERSE. This unmet dependency bug was found by Kismet, a static analysis tool for Kconfig. Please advise if this is not the appropriate solution. Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dd3b1dc ] sent_cmd memory is not freed before freeing hci_dev causing it to leak it contents. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
…when fully ready [ Upstream commit c5048a7 ] Register the CAN device only when all the necessary initialization is completed. This patch makes sure all the data structures and locks are initialized before registering the CAN device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Reported-by: Pavel Machek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pavel Machek <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ulrich Hecht <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d4e26aa ] The function ioremap() in fs_init() can fail, so its return value should be checked. Reported-by: TOTE Robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 17a8f31 ] Netfilter assumes its called with rcu_read_lock held, but in egress hook case it may be called with BH readlock. This triggers lockdep splat. In order to avoid to change all rcu_dereference() to rcu_dereference_check(..., rcu_read_lock_bh_held()), wrap nf_hook_slow with read lock/unlock pair. Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d176708 ] Use the new soc_intel_is_byt() helper from linux/platform_data/x86/soc.h. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
…errupt() resource [ Upstream commit d982992 ] ACPI/x86 devices with a Cherry Trail SoC should have a GpioInt + a regular GPIO ACPI resource in their ACPI tables. Some CHT devices have a bug, where the also is bogus interrupt resource (likely copied from a previous Bay Trail based generation of the device). The i2c-core-acpi code will assign the bogus, non-working, interrupt resource to client->irq. Add a workaround to fix this up. BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2043960 Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1db5fcb ] Some APs misbehave when TWT is used and cause our firmware to crash. We don't know a reasonable way to detect and work around this problem in the FW yet. To prevent these crashes, disable TWT in the driver by stopping to advertise TWT support. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215523 Signed-off-by: Golan Ben Ami <[email protected]> [reworded the commit message] Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6292972 ] VRR capable property is not attached by default to the connector It is attached only if VRR is supported. So if the driver tries to call drm core set prop function without it being attached that causes NULL dereference. Cc: Jani Nikula <[email protected]> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Manasi Navare <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e50b88c ] The wdev channel information is updated post channel switch only for the station mode and not for the other modes. Due to this, the P2P client still points to the old value though it moved to the new channel when the channel change is induced from the P2P GO. Update the bss channel after CSA channel switch completion for P2P client interface as well. Signed-off-by: Sreeramya Soratkal <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e3d5ea2 ] If recv_actor() returns an incorrect value, tcp_read_sock() might loop forever. Instead, issue a one time warning and make sure to make progress. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f1fb205 ] seqno could be read as a stale value outside of the lock. The lock is already acquired to protect the modification of seqno against a possible race condition. Place the reading of this value also inside this locking to protect it against a possible race condition. Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin Habets <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ccffe9 ] Fix an error message and report the correct failing function. Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b773827 ] The error message when I build vm tests on debian10 (GLIBC 2.28): userfaultfd.c: In function `userfaultfd_pagemap_test': userfaultfd.c:1393:37: error: `MADV_PAGEOUT' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean `MADV_RANDOM'? if (madvise(area_dst, test_pgsize, MADV_PAGEOUT)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~ MADV_RANDOM This patch includes these newer definitions from UAPI linux/mman.h, is useful to fix tests build on systems without these definitions in glibc sys/mman.h. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
commit 5cb1ebd upstream. Commit 5dbbbd0 ("ice: Avoid RTNL lock when re-creating auxiliary device") changes a process of re-creation of aux device so ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context. This unfortunately opens a race window that can result in dead-lock when interface has left LAG and immediately enters LAG again. Reproducer: ``` #!/bin/sh ip link add lag0 type bond mode 1 miimon 100 ip link set lag0 for n in {1..10}; do echo Cycle: $n ip link set ens7f0 master lag0 sleep 1 ip link set ens7f0 nomaster done ``` This results in: [20976.208697] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [20976.213422] Call Trace: [20976.215871] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830 [20976.219364] schedule+0x35/0xa0 [20976.222510] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 [20976.227043] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420 [20976.235071] enum_all_gids_of_dev_cb+0x1c/0x100 [ib_core] [20976.251215] ib_enum_roce_netdev+0xa4/0xe0 [ib_core] [20976.256192] ib_cache_setup_one+0x33/0xa0 [ib_core] [20976.261079] ib_register_device+0x40d/0x580 [ib_core] [20976.266139] irdma_ib_register_device+0x129/0x250 [irdma] [20976.281409] irdma_probe+0x2c1/0x360 [irdma] [20976.285691] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x45/0x70 [20976.289790] really_probe+0x1f2/0x480 [20976.298509] driver_probe_device+0x49/0xc0 [20976.302609] bus_for_each_drv+0x79/0xc0 [20976.306448] __device_attach+0xdc/0x160 [20976.310286] bus_probe_device+0x9d/0xb0 [20976.314128] device_add+0x43c/0x890 [20976.321287] __auxiliary_device_add+0x43/0x60 [20976.325644] ice_plug_aux_dev+0xb2/0x100 [ice] [20976.330109] ice_service_task+0xd0c/0xed0 [ice] [20976.342591] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [20976.350536] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [20976.358128] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [20976.365547] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 ... [20976.438030] task:ip state:D stack: 0 pid:213658 ppid:213627 flags:0x00004084 [20976.446469] Call Trace: [20976.448921] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830 [20976.452414] schedule+0x35/0xa0 [20976.455559] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 [20976.460090] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420 [20976.464364] device_del+0x36/0x3c0 [20976.467772] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice] [20976.472313] ice_lag_event_handler+0x2a2/0x520 [ice] [20976.477288] notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x70 [20976.481386] __netdev_upper_dev_link+0x18b/0x280 [20976.489845] bond_enslave+0xe05/0x1790 [bonding] [20976.494475] do_setlink+0x336/0xf50 [20976.502517] __rtnl_newlink+0x529/0x8b0 [20976.543441] rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60 [20976.546934] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2b1/0x360 [20976.559238] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x120 [20976.563079] netlink_unicast+0x196/0x230 [20976.567005] netlink_sendmsg+0x204/0x3d0 [20976.570930] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x50 [20976.574423] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1eb/0x250 [20976.586807] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0 [20976.606353] __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0 [20976.609930] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0 [20976.613598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca 1. Command 'ip link ... set nomaster' causes that ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context, aux device is created and associated device->lock is taken. 2. Command 'ip link ... set master...' calls ice's notifier under RTNL lock and that notifier calls ice_unplug_aux_dev(). That function tries to take aux device->lock but this is already taken by ice_plug_aux_dev() in step 1 3. Later ice_plug_aux_dev() tries to take RTNL lock but this is already taken in step 2 4. Dead-lock The patch fixes this issue by following changes: - Bit ICE_FLAG_PLUG_AUX_DEV is kept to be set during ice_plug_aux_dev() call in ice_service_task() - The bit is checked in ice_clear_rdma_cap() and only if it is not set then ice_unplug_aux_dev() is called. If it is set (in other words plugging of aux device was requested and ice_plug_aux_dev() is potentially running) then the function only clears the bit - Once ice_plug_aux_dev() call (in ice_service_task) is finished the bit ICE_FLAG_PLUG_AUX_DEV is cleared but it is also checked whether it was already cleared by ice_clear_rdma_cap(). If so then aux device is unplugged. Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Petr Oros <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Petr Oros <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Tested-by: Fox Chen <[email protected]> Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <[email protected]> Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ron Economos <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rudi Heitbaum <[email protected]> Tested-by: Luna Jernberg <[email protected]> Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
This is the 5.16.16 stable release Change-Id: Id68bf8047dd2204de272589e99e217e78e32187a
See issue tobetter#39: legacy drivers were deprecated in tobetter@0829c35
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Mar 13, 2023
[ Upstream commit 1596dae ] Xsk Tx can be triggered via either sendmsg() or poll() syscalls. These two paths share a call to common function xsk_xmit() which has two sanity checks within. A pseudo code example to show the two paths: __xsk_sendmsg() : xsk_poll(): if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) return -ENXIO; return mask; if (unlikely(need_wait)) (...) return -EOPNOTSUPP; xsk_xmit() mark napi id (...) xsk_xmit() xsk_xmit(): if (unlikely(!(xs->dev->flags & IFF_UP))) return -ENETDOWN; if (unlikely(!xs->tx)) return -ENOBUFS; As it can be observed above, in sendmsg() napi id can be marked on interface that was not brought up and this causes a NULL ptr dereference: [31757.505631] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 [31757.512710] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [31757.517936] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [31757.523149] PGD 0 P4D 0 [31757.525726] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [31757.530154] CPU: 26 PID: 95641 Comm: xdpsock Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5+ #40 [31757.536871] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [31757.547457] RIP: 0010:xsk_sendmsg+0xde/0x180 [31757.551799] Code: 00 75 a2 48 8b 00 a8 04 75 9b 84 d2 74 69 8b 85 14 01 00 00 85 c0 75 1b 48 8b 85 28 03 00 00 48 8b 80 98 00 00 00 48 8b 40 20 <8b> 40 18 89 85 14 01 00 00 8b bd 14 01 00 00 81 ff 00 01 00 00 0f [31757.570840] RSP: 0018:ffffc90034f27dc0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [31757.576143] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90034f27e18 RCX: 0000000000000000 [31757.583389] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90034f27e18 RDI: ffff88984cf3c100 [31757.590631] RBP: ffff88984714a800 R08: ffff88984714a800 R09: 0000000000000000 [31757.597877] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffffa [31757.605123] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [31757.612364] FS: 00007fb4c5931180(0000) GS:ffff88afdfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [31757.620571] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [31757.626406] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000184b41c003 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [31757.633648] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [31757.640894] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [31757.648139] PKRU: 55555554 [31757.650894] Call Trace: [31757.653385] <TASK> [31757.655524] sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xa0 [31757.659077] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x70 [31757.663416] __sys_sendto+0xfc/0x170 [31757.667051] ? do_sched_setscheduler+0xdb/0x1b0 [31757.671658] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 [31757.675557] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [31757.679197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [31757.687969] Code: 8e f6 ff 44 8b 4c 24 2c 4c 8b 44 24 20 41 89 c4 44 8b 54 24 28 48 8b 54 24 18 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 74 24 10 8b 7c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 3a 44 89 e7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 b5 8e f6 ff 48 [31757.707007] RSP: 002b:00007ffd49c73c70 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [31757.714694] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a996565380 RCX: 00007fb4c5727c16 [31757.721939] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [31757.729184] RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [31757.736429] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 [31757.743673] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [31757.754940] </TASK> To fix this, let's make xsk_xmit a function that will be responsible for generic Tx, where RCU is handled accordingly and pull out sanity checks and xs->zc handling. Populate sanity checks to __xsk_sendmsg() and xsk_poll(). Fixes: ca2e1a6 ("xsk: Mark napi_id on sendmsg()") Fixes: 18b1ab7 ("xsk: Fix race at socket teardown") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 1596dae ] Xsk Tx can be triggered via either sendmsg() or poll() syscalls. These two paths share a call to common function xsk_xmit() which has two sanity checks within. A pseudo code example to show the two paths: __xsk_sendmsg() : xsk_poll(): if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) return -ENXIO; return mask; if (unlikely(need_wait)) (...) return -EOPNOTSUPP; xsk_xmit() mark napi id (...) xsk_xmit() xsk_xmit(): if (unlikely(!(xs->dev->flags & IFF_UP))) return -ENETDOWN; if (unlikely(!xs->tx)) return -ENOBUFS; As it can be observed above, in sendmsg() napi id can be marked on interface that was not brought up and this causes a NULL ptr dereference: [31757.505631] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 [31757.512710] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [31757.517936] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [31757.523149] PGD 0 P4D 0 [31757.525726] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [31757.530154] CPU: 26 PID: 95641 Comm: xdpsock Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5+ #40 [31757.536871] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [31757.547457] RIP: 0010:xsk_sendmsg+0xde/0x180 [31757.551799] Code: 00 75 a2 48 8b 00 a8 04 75 9b 84 d2 74 69 8b 85 14 01 00 00 85 c0 75 1b 48 8b 85 28 03 00 00 48 8b 80 98 00 00 00 48 8b 40 20 <8b> 40 18 89 85 14 01 00 00 8b bd 14 01 00 00 81 ff 00 01 00 00 0f [31757.570840] RSP: 0018:ffffc90034f27dc0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [31757.576143] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90034f27e18 RCX: 0000000000000000 [31757.583389] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90034f27e18 RDI: ffff88984cf3c100 [31757.590631] RBP: ffff88984714a800 R08: ffff88984714a800 R09: 0000000000000000 [31757.597877] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffffa [31757.605123] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [31757.612364] FS: 00007fb4c5931180(0000) GS:ffff88afdfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [31757.620571] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [31757.626406] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000184b41c003 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [31757.633648] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [31757.640894] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [31757.648139] PKRU: 55555554 [31757.650894] Call Trace: [31757.653385] <TASK> [31757.655524] sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xa0 [31757.659077] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x70 [31757.663416] __sys_sendto+0xfc/0x170 [31757.667051] ? do_sched_setscheduler+0xdb/0x1b0 [31757.671658] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 [31757.675557] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [31757.679197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [31757.687969] Code: 8e f6 ff 44 8b 4c 24 2c 4c 8b 44 24 20 41 89 c4 44 8b 54 24 28 48 8b 54 24 18 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 74 24 10 8b 7c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 3a 44 89 e7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 b5 8e f6 ff 48 [31757.707007] RSP: 002b:00007ffd49c73c70 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [31757.714694] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a996565380 RCX: 00007fb4c5727c16 [31757.721939] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [31757.729184] RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [31757.736429] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 [31757.743673] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [31757.754940] </TASK> To fix this, let's make xsk_xmit a function that will be responsible for generic Tx, where RCU is handled accordingly and pull out sanity checks and xs->zc handling. Populate sanity checks to __xsk_sendmsg() and xsk_poll(). Fixes: ca2e1a6 ("xsk: Mark napi_id on sendmsg()") Fixes: 18b1ab7 ("xsk: Fix race at socket teardown") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 1e56086 upstream. A last minute revert in 6.7-final introduced a potential deadlock when enabling ASPM during probe of Qualcomm PCIe controllers as reported by lockdep: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.7.0 #40 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u16:5/90 is trying to acquire lock: ffffacfa78ced000 (pci_bus_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: pcie_aspm_pm_state_change+0x58/0xdc but task is already holding lock: ffffacfa78ced000 (pci_bus_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: pci_walk_bus+0x34/0xbc other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(pci_bus_sem); lock(pci_bus_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: print_deadlock_bug+0x25c/0x348 __lock_acquire+0x10a4/0x2064 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x318 down_read+0x60/0x184 pcie_aspm_pm_state_change+0x58/0xdc pci_set_full_power_state+0xa8/0x114 pci_set_power_state+0xc4/0x120 qcom_pcie_enable_aspm+0x1c/0x3c [pcie_qcom] pci_walk_bus+0x64/0xbc qcom_pcie_host_post_init_2_7_0+0x28/0x34 [pcie_qcom] The deadlock can easily be reproduced on machines like the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s by adding a delay to increase the race window during asynchronous probe where another thread can take a write lock. Add a new pci_set_power_state_locked() and associated helper functions that can be called with the PCI bus semaphore held to avoid taking the read lock twice. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f93e71a ("Revert "PCI/ASPM: Remove pcie_aspm_pm_state_change()"") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 6.7 [bhelgaas: backported to v6.6.y, which contains 8cc22ba ("Revert "PCI/ASPM: Remove pcie_aspm_pm_state_change()""), a backport of f93e71a. This omits the drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c hunk that updates qcom_pcie_enable_aspm(), which was added by 9f4f3df ("PCI: qcom: Enable ASPM for platforms supporting 1.9.0 ops"), which is not present in v6.6.28.] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 1e56086 upstream. A last minute revert in 6.7-final introduced a potential deadlock when enabling ASPM during probe of Qualcomm PCIe controllers as reported by lockdep: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.7.0 #40 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u16:5/90 is trying to acquire lock: ffffacfa78ced000 (pci_bus_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: pcie_aspm_pm_state_change+0x58/0xdc but task is already holding lock: ffffacfa78ced000 (pci_bus_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: pci_walk_bus+0x34/0xbc other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(pci_bus_sem); lock(pci_bus_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: print_deadlock_bug+0x25c/0x348 __lock_acquire+0x10a4/0x2064 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x318 down_read+0x60/0x184 pcie_aspm_pm_state_change+0x58/0xdc pci_set_full_power_state+0xa8/0x114 pci_set_power_state+0xc4/0x120 qcom_pcie_enable_aspm+0x1c/0x3c [pcie_qcom] pci_walk_bus+0x64/0xbc qcom_pcie_host_post_init_2_7_0+0x28/0x34 [pcie_qcom] The deadlock can easily be reproduced on machines like the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s by adding a delay to increase the race window during asynchronous probe where another thread can take a write lock. Add a new pci_set_power_state_locked() and associated helper functions that can be called with the PCI bus semaphore held to avoid taking the read lock twice. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f93e71a ("Revert "PCI/ASPM: Remove pcie_aspm_pm_state_change()"") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # 6.7 [bhelgaas: backported to v6.1.y, which contains b9c370b ("Revert "PCI/ASPM: Remove pcie_aspm_pm_state_change()""), a backport of f93e71a. This omits the drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c hunk that updates qcom_pcie_enable_aspm(), which was added by 9f4f3df ("PCI: qcom: Enable ASPM for platforms supporting 1.9.0 ops"), which is not present in v6.1.87.] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 60f07e2 ] We use uprobe in aarch64_be, which we found the tracee task would exit due to SIGILL when we enable the uprobe trace. We can see the replace inst from uprobe is not correct in aarch big-endian. As in Armv8-A, instruction fetches are always treated as little-endian, we should treat the UPROBE_SWBP_INSN as little-endian。 The test case is as following。 bash-4.4# ./mqueue_test_aarchbe 1 1 2 1 10 > /dev/null & bash-4.4# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/ bash-4.4# echo 'p:test /mqueue_test_aarchbe:0xc30 %x0 %x1' > uprobe_events bash-4.4# echo 1 > events/uprobes/enable bash-4.4# bash-4.4# ps PID TTY TIME CMD 140 ? 00:00:01 bash 237 ? 00:00:00 ps [1]+ Illegal instruction ./mqueue_test_aarchbe 1 1 2 1 100 > /dev/null which we debug use gdb as following: bash-4.4# gdb attach 155 (gdb) disassemble send Dump of assembler code for function send: 0x0000000000400c30 <+0>: .inst 0xa00020d4 ; undefined 0x0000000000400c34 <+4>: mov x29, sp 0x0000000000400c38 <+8>: str w0, [sp, #28] 0x0000000000400c3c <+12>: strb w1, [sp, #27] 0x0000000000400c40 <+16>: str xzr, [sp, #40] 0x0000000000400c44 <+20>: str xzr, [sp, #48] 0x0000000000400c48 <+24>: add x0, sp, #0x1b 0x0000000000400c4c <+28>: mov w3, #0x0 // #0 0x0000000000400c50 <+32>: mov x2, #0x1 // #1 0x0000000000400c54 <+36>: mov x1, x0 0x0000000000400c58 <+40>: ldr w0, [sp, #28] 0x0000000000400c5c <+44>: bl 0x405e10 <mq_send> 0x0000000000400c60 <+48>: str w0, [sp, torvalds#60] 0x0000000000400c64 <+52>: ldr w0, [sp, torvalds#60] 0x0000000000400c68 <+56>: ldp x29, x30, [sp], torvalds#64 0x0000000000400c6c <+60>: ret End of assembler dump. (gdb) info b No breakpoints or watchpoints. (gdb) c Continuing. Program received signal SIGILL, Illegal instruction. 0x0000000000400c30 in send () (gdb) x/10x 0x400c30 0x400c30 <send>: 0xd42000a0 0xfd030091 0xe01f00b9 0xe16f0039 0x400c40 <send+16>: 0xff1700f9 0xff1b00f9 0xe06f0091 0x03008052 0x400c50 <send+32>: 0x220080d2 0xe10300aa (gdb) disassemble 0x400c30 Dump of assembler code for function send: => 0x0000000000400c30 <+0>: .inst 0xa00020d4 ; undefined 0x0000000000400c34 <+4>: mov x29, sp 0x0000000000400c38 <+8>: str w0, [sp, #28] 0x0000000000400c3c <+12>: strb w1, [sp, #27] 0x0000000000400c40 <+16>: str xzr, [sp, #40] Signed-off-by: junhua huang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: 13f8f1e ("arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 60f07e2 ] We use uprobe in aarch64_be, which we found the tracee task would exit due to SIGILL when we enable the uprobe trace. We can see the replace inst from uprobe is not correct in aarch big-endian. As in Armv8-A, instruction fetches are always treated as little-endian, we should treat the UPROBE_SWBP_INSN as little-endian。 The test case is as following。 bash-4.4# ./mqueue_test_aarchbe 1 1 2 1 10 > /dev/null & bash-4.4# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/ bash-4.4# echo 'p:test /mqueue_test_aarchbe:0xc30 %x0 %x1' > uprobe_events bash-4.4# echo 1 > events/uprobes/enable bash-4.4# bash-4.4# ps PID TTY TIME CMD 140 ? 00:00:01 bash 237 ? 00:00:00 ps [1]+ Illegal instruction ./mqueue_test_aarchbe 1 1 2 1 100 > /dev/null which we debug use gdb as following: bash-4.4# gdb attach 155 (gdb) disassemble send Dump of assembler code for function send: 0x0000000000400c30 <+0>: .inst 0xa00020d4 ; undefined 0x0000000000400c34 <+4>: mov x29, sp 0x0000000000400c38 <+8>: str w0, [sp, #28] 0x0000000000400c3c <+12>: strb w1, [sp, #27] 0x0000000000400c40 <+16>: str xzr, [sp, #40] 0x0000000000400c44 <+20>: str xzr, [sp, #48] 0x0000000000400c48 <+24>: add x0, sp, #0x1b 0x0000000000400c4c <+28>: mov w3, #0x0 // #0 0x0000000000400c50 <+32>: mov x2, #0x1 // #1 0x0000000000400c54 <+36>: mov x1, x0 0x0000000000400c58 <+40>: ldr w0, [sp, #28] 0x0000000000400c5c <+44>: bl 0x405e10 <mq_send> 0x0000000000400c60 <+48>: str w0, [sp, torvalds#60] 0x0000000000400c64 <+52>: ldr w0, [sp, torvalds#60] 0x0000000000400c68 <+56>: ldp x29, x30, [sp], torvalds#64 0x0000000000400c6c <+60>: ret End of assembler dump. (gdb) info b No breakpoints or watchpoints. (gdb) c Continuing. Program received signal SIGILL, Illegal instruction. 0x0000000000400c30 in send () (gdb) x/10x 0x400c30 0x400c30 <send>: 0xd42000a0 0xfd030091 0xe01f00b9 0xe16f0039 0x400c40 <send+16>: 0xff1700f9 0xff1b00f9 0xe06f0091 0x03008052 0x400c50 <send+32>: 0x220080d2 0xe10300aa (gdb) disassemble 0x400c30 Dump of assembler code for function send: => 0x0000000000400c30 <+0>: .inst 0xa00020d4 ; undefined 0x0000000000400c34 <+4>: mov x29, sp 0x0000000000400c38 <+8>: str w0, [sp, #28] 0x0000000000400c3c <+12>: strb w1, [sp, #27] 0x0000000000400c40 <+16>: str xzr, [sp, #40] Signed-off-by: junhua huang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: 13f8f1e ("arm64: probes: Fix uprobes for big-endian kernels") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 #10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f #11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf #12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 #13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 #14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d #15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e #16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad #17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e #18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 #19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 #20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 #21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 #22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 #23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 #24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 #25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc #26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 #27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 #28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 #29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d #30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 #31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 #32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 #33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d #34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 #35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e #36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 #37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 #38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 #39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 #40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 #41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <[email protected]> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…on memory commit d613f53 upstream. When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…on memory commit d613f53 upstream. When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Oct 13, 2025
…on memory commit d613f53 upstream. When I did memory failure tests, below panic occurs: page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:616! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-00195-g148743902568 #40 RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80 vfs_write+0xd5/0x540 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f08f0314887 RSP: 002b:00007ffece710078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: 00007f08f0314887 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000564787a30410 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000564787a30410 R08: 000000000000fefe R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000009 R13: 00007f08f041b780 R14: 00007f08f0417600 R15: 00007f08f0416a00 </TASK> Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:unpoison_memory+0x2f3/0x590 RSP: 0018:ffffa57fc8787d60 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000037 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff9be25fcdc9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9be25fcdc9c0 RBP: 0000000000300000 R08: ffffffffb4956f88 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000284 R11: ffffffffb4926fa0 R12: ffffe6b00c000000 R13: ffff9bdb453dfd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f08f04e4740(0000) GS:ffff9be25fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000564787a30410 CR3: 000000010d4e2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x31c00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- The root cause is that unpoison_memory() tries to check the PG_HWPoison flags of an uninitialized page. So VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(page)) is triggered. This can be reproduced by below steps: 1.Offline memory block: echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory12/state 2.Get offlined memory pfn: page-types -b n -rlN 3.Write pfn to unpoison-pfn echo <pfn> > /sys/kernel/debug/hwpoison/unpoison-pfn This scenario can be identified by pfn_to_online_page() returning NULL. And ZONE_DEVICE pages are never expected, so we can simply fail if pfn_to_online_page() == NULL to fix the bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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