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Update atyfb_base.c #441
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Structure atyclk is copied to userland with padding bytes after "vclk_post_div" field unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero. or it will allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory by reading a copy of this structure
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'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]>
… to userspace 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. BUG=chromium:762904 TEST=Build and run Change-Id: I414c8ad7057bfb560bfd15d5342e45e4ea0edb52 References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8e75f7a) Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/673347 Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b188b51c98c5ffecc59978f0098c6c28b4313220)
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: ahmedradaideh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit af8a85a ] Calling ceph_buffer_put() in fill_inode() may result in freeing the i_xattrs.blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be fixed by postponing the call until later, when the lock is released. The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/070. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3852, name: kworker/0:4 6 locks held by kworker/0:4/3852: #0: 000000004270f6bb ((wq_completion)ceph-msgr){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 #1: 00000000eb420803 ((work_completion)(&(&con->work)->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 #2: 00000000be1c53a4 (&s->s_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x288/0x1476 #3: 00000000559cb958 (&mdsc->snap_rwsem){++++}, at: dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476 #4: 000000000d5ebbae (&req->r_fill_mutex){+.+.}, at: dispatch+0x2fc/0x1476 #5: 00000000a83d0514 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: fill_inode.isra.0+0xf8/0xf70 CPU: 0 PID: 3852 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.2.0+ torvalds#441 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 ___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1 vfree+0x4b/0x60 ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60 fill_inode.isra.0+0xa9b/0xf70 ceph_fill_trace+0x13b/0xc70 ? dispatch+0x2eb/0x1476 dispatch+0x320/0x1476 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x4d/0x2a0 ceph_con_workfn+0xc97/0x2ec0 ? process_one_work+0x1b8/0x5f0 process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0 kthread+0x105/0x140 ? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Fix checkpatch warnings:
WARNING: Use #include <linux/io.h> instead of <asm/io.h>
torvalds#38: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:38:
+#include <asm/io.h>
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#109: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:109:
+#define ZILOG_CHANNEL_FROM_PORT(PORT) ((struct zilog_channel __iomem *)((PORT)->membase))
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#116: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:116:
+#define ZS_WANTS_MODEM_STATUS(UP) ((UP)->flags & SUNZILOG_FLAG_MODEM_STATUS)
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#179: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:179:
+static int __load_zsregs(struct zilog_channel __iomem *channel, unsigned char *regs)
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
torvalds#188: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:188:
+ unsigned char stat = read_zsreg(channel, R1);
+ if (stat & ALL_SNT)
ERROR: trailing whitespace
torvalds#231: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:231:
+^I$
WARNING: braces {} are not necessary for any arm of this statement
torvalds#276: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:276:
+ if (ZS_TX_ACTIVE(up)) {
[...]
+ } else {
[...]
ERROR: else should follow close brace '}'
torvalds#378: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:378:
+ }
+ else if (r1 & PAR_ERR)
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
torvalds#397: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:397:
+^I^I ^Itty_insert_flip_char(port, ch, flag);$
WARNING: please, no space before tabs
torvalds#397: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:397:
+^I^I ^Itty_insert_flip_char(port, ch, flag);$
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#440: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:440:
+ /* The Zilog just gives us an interrupt when DCD/CTS/etc. change.
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#441: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:441:
+ * But it does not tell us which bit has changed, we have to keep
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
torvalds#464: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:464:
+ unsigned char status = readb(&channel->control);
+ ZSDELAY();
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#468: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:468:
+ * It can occur because of how we do serial console writes. It would
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#469: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:469:
+ * be nice to transmit console writes just like we normally would for
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#470: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:470:
+ * a TTY line. (ie. buffered and TX interrupt driven). That is not
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#471: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:471:
+ * easy because console writes cannot sleep. One solution might be
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#593: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:593:
+static __inline__ unsigned char sunzilog_read_channel_status(struct uart_port *port)
WARNING: plain inline is preferred over __inline__
torvalds#593: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:593:
+static __inline__ unsigned char sunzilog_read_channel_status(struct uart_port *port)
ERROR: trailing whitespace
torvalds#664: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:664:
+^I/* NOTE: Not subject to 'transmitter active' rule. */ $
ERROR: trailing whitespace
torvalds#752: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:752:
+^I^I/* NOTE: Not subject to 'transmitter active' rule. */ $
ERROR: trailing whitespace
torvalds#779: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:779:
+^I^I/* NOTE: Not subject to 'transmitter active' rule. */ $
WARNING: line over 80 characters
torvalds#999: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:999:
+static int sunzilog_verify_port(struct uart_port *port, struct serial_struct *ser)
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
torvalds#1142: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1142:
+ unsigned char val = readb(&channel->control);
+ if (val & Tx_BUF_EMP) {
WARNING: Prefer [subsystem eg: netdev]_info([subsystem]dev, ... then dev_info(dev, ... then pr_info(... to printk(KERN_INFO ...
torvalds#1230: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1230:
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Console: ttyS%d (SunZilog zs%d)\n",
WARNING: braces {} are not necessary for single statement blocks
#1383: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1383:
+ if (__load_zsregs(channel, up->curregs)) {
+ up->flags |= SUNZILOG_FLAG_ESCC;
+ }
WARNING: quoted string split across lines
#1493: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1493:
+ dev_info(&op->dev, "Keyboard at MMIO 0x%llx (irq = %d) "
+ "is a %s\n",
WARNING: quoted string split across lines
#1497: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1497:
+ dev_info(&op->dev, "Mouse at MMIO 0x%llx (irq = %d) "
+ "is a %s\n",
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
#1581: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1581:
+ struct uart_sunzilog_port *up = sunzilog_irq_chain;
+ err = request_irq(zilog_irq, sunzilog_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED,
WARNING: line over 80 characters
#1590: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1590:
+ /* printk (KERN_INFO "Enable IRQ for ZILOG Hardware %p\n", up); */
WARNING: line over 80 characters
#1627: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1627:
+ /* printk (KERN_INFO "Disable IRQ for ZILOG Hardware %p\n", up); */
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1248: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1248:
+ case B150: baud = 150; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1249: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1249:
+ case B300: baud = 300; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1250: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1250:
+ case B600: baud = 600; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1251: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1251:
+ case B1200: baud = 1200; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1252: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1252:
+ case B2400: baud = 2400; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1253: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1253:
+ case B4800: baud = 4800; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1254: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1254:
+ default: case B9600: baud = 9600; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1255: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1255:
+ case B19200: baud = 19200; break;
ERROR: trailing statements should be on next line
torvalds#1256: FILE: drivers/tty/serial/sunzilog.c:1256:
+ case B38400: baud = 38400; break;
Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt <[email protected]>
the following script: # tc qdisc add dev eth0 handle 0x1 root fq_pie flows 2 # tc qdisc add dev eth0 clsact # tc filter add dev eth0 egress matchall action skbedit priority 0x10002 # ping 192.0.2.2 -I eth0 -c2 -w1 -q produces the following splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888171306924 by task ping/942 CPU: 3 PID: 942 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0+ torvalds#441 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1034/0x2b10 ip_finish_output2+0xc62/0x2120 __ip_finish_output+0x553/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fe69735c3eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007fff06d7fb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e961413700 RCX: 00007fe69735c3eb RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055e961413700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 000055e961410500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff06d81260 R13: 00007fff06d7fb40 R14: 00007fff06d7fc30 R15: 000055e96140f0a0 Allocated by task 917: kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xa0 __kmalloc_node+0x139/0x280 fq_pie_init+0x555/0x8e8 [sch_fq_pie] qdisc_create+0x407/0x11b0 tc_modify_qdisc+0x3c2/0x17e0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x346/0x8e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888171306800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 36 bytes to the right of 256-byte region [ffff888171306800, ffff888171306900) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000bcfb624e refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x171306 head:00000000bcfb624e order:1 compound_mapcount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888171306800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888171306880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc >ffff888171306900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888171306980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888171306a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fix fq_pie traffic path to avoid selecting 'q->flows + q->flows_cnt' as a valid flow: it's an address beyond the allocated memory. Fixes: ec97ecf ("net: sched: add Flow Queue PIE packet scheduler") CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]>
the following script: # tc qdisc add dev eth0 handle 0x1 root fq_pie flows 2 # tc qdisc add dev eth0 clsact # tc filter add dev eth0 egress matchall action skbedit priority 0x10002 # ping 192.0.2.2 -I eth0 -c2 -w1 -q produces the following splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888171306924 by task ping/942 CPU: 3 PID: 942 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0+ torvalds#441 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1034/0x2b10 ip_finish_output2+0xc62/0x2120 __ip_finish_output+0x553/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fe69735c3eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007fff06d7fb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e961413700 RCX: 00007fe69735c3eb RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055e961413700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 000055e961410500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff06d81260 R13: 00007fff06d7fb40 R14: 00007fff06d7fc30 R15: 000055e96140f0a0 Allocated by task 917: kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xa0 __kmalloc_node+0x139/0x280 fq_pie_init+0x555/0x8e8 [sch_fq_pie] qdisc_create+0x407/0x11b0 tc_modify_qdisc+0x3c2/0x17e0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x346/0x8e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888171306800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 36 bytes to the right of 256-byte region [ffff888171306800, ffff888171306900) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000bcfb624e refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x171306 head:00000000bcfb624e order:1 compound_mapcount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888171306800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888171306880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc >ffff888171306900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888171306980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888171306a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fix fq_pie traffic path to avoid selecting 'q->flows + q->flows_cnt' as a valid flow: it's an address beyond the allocated memory. Fixes: ec97ecf ("net: sched: add Flow Queue PIE packet scheduler") CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
commit e70f7a1 upstream. the following script: # tc qdisc add dev eth0 handle 0x1 root fq_pie flows 2 # tc qdisc add dev eth0 clsact # tc filter add dev eth0 egress matchall action skbedit priority 0x10002 # ping 192.0.2.2 -I eth0 -c2 -w1 -q produces the following splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888171306924 by task ping/942 CPU: 3 PID: 942 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0+ torvalds#441 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1034/0x2b10 ip_finish_output2+0xc62/0x2120 __ip_finish_output+0x553/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fe69735c3eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007fff06d7fb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e961413700 RCX: 00007fe69735c3eb RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055e961413700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 000055e961410500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff06d81260 R13: 00007fff06d7fb40 R14: 00007fff06d7fc30 R15: 000055e96140f0a0 Allocated by task 917: kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xa0 __kmalloc_node+0x139/0x280 fq_pie_init+0x555/0x8e8 [sch_fq_pie] qdisc_create+0x407/0x11b0 tc_modify_qdisc+0x3c2/0x17e0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x346/0x8e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888171306800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 36 bytes to the right of 256-byte region [ffff888171306800, ffff888171306900) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000bcfb624e refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x171306 head:00000000bcfb624e order:1 compound_mapcount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888171306800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888171306880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc >ffff888171306900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888171306980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888171306a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fix fq_pie traffic path to avoid selecting 'q->flows + q->flows_cnt' as a valid flow: it's an address beyond the allocated memory. Fixes: ec97ecf ("net: sched: add Flow Queue PIE packet scheduler") CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit e70f7a1 upstream. the following script: # tc qdisc add dev eth0 handle 0x1 root fq_pie flows 2 # tc qdisc add dev eth0 clsact # tc filter add dev eth0 egress matchall action skbedit priority 0x10002 # ping 192.0.2.2 -I eth0 -c2 -w1 -q produces the following splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888171306924 by task ping/942 CPU: 3 PID: 942 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0+ torvalds#441 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 fq_pie_qdisc_enqueue+0x1314/0x19d0 [sch_fq_pie] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1034/0x2b10 ip_finish_output2+0xc62/0x2120 __ip_finish_output+0x553/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fe69735c3eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007fff06d7fb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e961413700 RCX: 00007fe69735c3eb RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055e961413700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 000055e961410500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff06d81260 R13: 00007fff06d7fb40 R14: 00007fff06d7fc30 R15: 000055e96140f0a0 Allocated by task 917: kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xa0 __kmalloc_node+0x139/0x280 fq_pie_init+0x555/0x8e8 [sch_fq_pie] qdisc_create+0x407/0x11b0 tc_modify_qdisc+0x3c2/0x17e0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x346/0x8e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888171306800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 36 bytes to the right of 256-byte region [ffff888171306800, ffff888171306900) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000bcfb624e refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x171306 head:00000000bcfb624e order:1 compound_mapcount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888171306800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888171306880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc >ffff888171306900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888171306980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888171306a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fix fq_pie traffic path to avoid selecting 'q->flows + q->flows_cnt' as a valid flow: it's an address beyond the allocated memory. Fixes: ec97ecf ("net: sched: add Flow Queue PIE packet scheduler") CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
rust: Removes alloc_error_handler feature
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit cf924d80ece3b3e549efdc96fc4ea5d219410692)
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8e75f7a7a00461ef6d91797a60b606367f6e344d upstream. 'clk' is copied to a userland with padding byte(s) after 'vclk_post_div' field unitialized, leaking data from the stack. Fix this ensuring all of 'clk' is initialized to zero. References: torvalds/linux#441 Reported-by: sohu0106 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Structure atyclk is copied to userland with padding bytes after
"vclk_post_div" field unitialized. It leads to leaking of
contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero. or it will allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory by reading a copy of this structure